Analyzing financial sectors in transition : with special reference to the Former Soviet Union by Roe, Alan et al.
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1982
Analyzing  Financial  Sectors  One  resultofignoringthe
true messiness  of the
in Transition  transition  from  a command  to
a market  economry  is  that
With Special Reference to  govemrnments  are  sometimes
offered  fRawed  policy
the Former Soviet Union  recommendations  and
conclusions  that  are at odds
Alan  Roe  with reality.  Here  is a
Paul  Siegelbaum  framework  for reflecting  on
Tim  King  certain  features  of bank
behavior during the transition
from a command to a market
economy - and on public
policy interventions for the
sector  often advocated by the
International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank,  and other
donor agencies.
The World Bank


















































































































dPOLI5)1  1CY R'SEA}RCH W0V  NKt  ;I PAI'ER I 982
Summary findin,gs
The economic transition from a command to a market  This lfi,aitwoVrk  suggests that  Ole  saiety of an
economny  is a complex, nmessy  process, during whichi  the  individual bank (land by cxteuisiort the systemi)  depends
incentives of economic agents may be significantly  on rlit-ee  factors tliai evolve significantly durinig  the
diffcrent from incentives familiar to Western  economies.  trausition:
As a result, attempts to tranisplant Western instituLtional  The  h  ankus own inrterial inforijiation and
and regulatory norms of good practice into transitioni  information processing capabilities.
economies may produce disappointing, even  - The sophisticationi of the banking products  it tries to
counterproductive,  results.  offer.
Roe, Siegelbaum, and King show some specific  Tlhe external operating environment the bank faces
characteristics of transition economies that are likely to  (an environment that is affected by almost all aspects of
have an impact on bank behavior and safety. They argue  transition reform).
that these characteristics do not inevitably fade away as  Among their many conclusions:
the transition proceeds; indeed, they may endure for an  Bank "safety" is an elusive concept in transition
extended period.  economies, one not easily managed.
This being so, Roe, Siegelbaum, and King propose a  A transitional banking system may be quite "safe"
simple analytical framework designed to shed light on  even though regulatory reforrm  may have progressed only
the characteristics of the banking sector during the  minimally.
transition. This framework relies on familiar theories of  Their analysis helps to account for several paradoxes
asymmetric information and the potential advantages  observed in transition banking systems, inciuding the
banks have in mitigating both the adverse risk and moral  relatively long-term survival of banks which by any
hazard associated with imperfect informnation.  objective standard are insolvent.
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Section I: Introduction
1.  I'his paper proposes a framework  for analyzing  the evolution of  financial  sectors in
economies  transiting from command  to market structures. Most commentators  have tended to
regard this "Transition" as an undifferentiated  period to be traversed as rapidly as possible. In
doing so they ignore the increasing evidence  that the Transition can be an extended, even
enduring, state of the world, resulting from a complex interaction of economic, political, cultural
and psychological  factors As such, it can and does generate incentives  which fundamentally
distort the behavior of economic agents in unpredictable  ways. We argue that one result of
ignoring the true messiness  of the Transition is that the analysis  and policy recommendations
offered to governments can be flawed  and often provide conclusions  which are odds with the
reality on the ground. The paper discusses  this concern and proposes a simple analytical
framework  both for focusing on the Transition itself and also for use in defining  and evaluating
possible public policy interventions  for the banking sector.
2.  The proposed framework leans heavily  on the analvtical  approach of asymmetric
information,  which has proved so useful in understanding  both the dangers to which banks are
exposed in all marketbased economies and the special role of banks in the development  process.'
For example,  we have learned that, because banks have an  advantage in collecting relevant
information  about current and prospective  borrowers, they also have an advantage  in limiting  the
common problems of adverse risk selection  (riskier  borrowers being willing  to pay more for
credit) and moral hazard (riskier  borrowers being  willing  to seek badly needed returns by taking
greater risk in the deployment  of funds). It is widely  believed that the special difficulties  in
acquiring accurate information  about private clients in developing  economies makes banks even
2 more important in those situations.  These informational  advantages of banks also gives them an
edge over securities markets in the early stages of development.5
2 The authors zre grateful  for perceptive  cominenits  from several  colleagues  including  Millard Long, Gerry  Caprio, Hennie  van Greuning, Alex
Fleming,  Michael Fuchs, Martha de Melo, Gregorio  Impavido,  Gerhard Pohl. Femando  Monites  Negret, lrfan Aleem, Itzhak Goldberg,  S
Ramachandrar, Alfred Steinherr  an  d Gail Buyske.  The paper  has been improved  considerably  as a result of  these comnuents.  The deficiencies
remaining are entirely those  of the authors.
3See, for exarrple, an excellent  recent paper on financial  crises. Frederic  S. Mishkin,  'Understanding Financial  Crises: A Developing  Country
Perspective"  ir Annual  World Bank  Conference  on Development  Economics,  (M.Bruno  and B. Pleskovic),  editors,  World  Bank,  Washington  DC
1997.
4See  L. Rojas-Suarez  and S.R. Weisbrod,  "Financial  Market Fragilities in Latin America:  From Banking Crisis  Resolution  to Current Policy
Challenges."  IMF Working Paper WP/94/117. IMF, Washington,  1994.
5 The issue  and trading of securities  places  the onus  on individual  investors  in those securities  to acquire  relevant
information  on the riskiness  of the issuer. The  literature  clearly  explains  wly the balance  of the private
costs/benefits  of this information  and screening  process  is likely  to discourage  an adequate  level  of such  activity.
See  for example, C. Mayer,  "Financial  Systems,  Corporate  Finance  and  Economic  Development."  in R.G.
Hubbard  (editor),  Asymmetric infonnation, Corporate  Finance and investnent.  Universitv  of Chicago  Press. 1990.
See  also
23.  In the unique circumstances of the Transition, however, the content, sources and uses of
information relevant to bankers are all very different, as are the observed behavior patterns of
bankers, their customers and bank regulators. Thus, for example, a portion of the informational
advantages ascribed to banks is derived from their special relationships of trust, built on long-
term, commercial connections with enterprises. In the early stages of the Transition, however,
fumdamental ownership and other commercial relationships are "up for grabs" as a result of
privatization and other structural reforms, as well as in the realignment of traditional trade links.
Wholly new sources of finance 6 have become available for both privatized and new start-up
enterprises, which effectively limit the basis for this trust.  From this,  we can surmise that the
information advantages of banks will be significantly less important in the early stages of the
Transition, than in more settled economics.  At the same time, it can be observed that Transition
banks have been forced to adopt alternative mechanisms to protect themselves from risk.  It is
important for us to understand these alternative mechanisms, how they arise, how they evolve as
the Transition proceeds, how they are effected by various policy reforms and, ultimately, how
they ought to influence the policy advice offered.
4.  This paper is organized as follows.  Section II sketches the main shortcomings of the
traditional analyses of the financial sector in transition -particularly the limitations of current
thinking on the sequencing of financial sector reforms.  Section III introduces and elaborates on
the basic framework proposed. Section IV uses the framework to distill some simple but
important propositions about transition banking. Section V provides an initial qualitative test of
the framework, by using it as a lens through which to view some of the characteristics of
transition banks which we have observed. It shows that behavior patterns which, at first glance,
seem curious and counterproductive, do indeed have a rational explanation when viewed in
relation to the analytical framework we propose.  Section VI applies the proposed analytical
approach to assess the appropriateness of various interventions -- especially those which have
proved popular in the World Bank --  to support the financial sector transition. Two Annexes
then elaborate particular aspects of the analysis. Annex 1 assesses how our analysis might re-
condition  thinking about the appropriate regulatory and supervisory structures for transition
banking. Annex 2 provides some initial empirical results based on our proposed framework of
analysis.
Section II: Limitations of the Conventional Analysis
J.E.  Stiglitz,  "Credit  Markets  and  the  Control  of Capital"  Journal  of Money,  Credit  and  Banking,  17  (2, May),  1985.
Stiglitz  argues  that  well  functioning  stock  markets  quickly  reveal  information  to investors  through  the  rapid
publication  of  price  changes.  However,  this  reduces  rather  than  enhances  incentives  to commit  private  resources  to
obtain  information  about  the  financial  situation  of enterprises.  This  is  partly  because  the  benefits  of that  information
cannot  be easily  confined  to those  who  expend  the  effort  in gathering  it.  Recent  theoretical  papers  have  also
supported  earlier  empirical  observation  that  equity  market  development  occurs  relatively  late  in the  development
process.  See,  for  example,  J.  Boyd  and  B. Smith,  "The  Co-Evolution  of the  Real  and  Financial  Sectors  in the
Growth  Process,"  The World  Bank  Economic  Review,  May 1996.
6 These  new  sources  include  not only  traditional  forms  of funding  from  banks  and  the  capital  markets,  but  informal
"funding"  from  the  deferral  of payables  to employees,  the  tax  collector,  enterprise  suppliers  and  energy  providers.
35.  For economies attempting the transition from a socialist command structure to a
capitalist free market structure, the characteristics of the "transition" are fundamentally different
from the state of the world previously or subsequently. Much of the accepted analysis in this
area describes well the situation just before transition begins, as well as the state which it is
hoped will exist when transition is complete.
6.  The starting point of transition typically reflects a financial sector dominated by "banks"
which are owned directly or indirectly by the State.  These "banks" provide resources, in the
form of credits, mainly to state-owned enterprises; they enjoy the explicit or implicit guarantee of
the State; they have little or no risk management skills; they produce accounts under an
accounting,  system designed to facilitate production planning, as opposed to illuminating their
financial condition, 7 and they are subject to little or no regulatory supervision, although they are
closely controlled politically 8. Their role in the economy is to provide funding, as directed, for
the central economic plan.  They are usually not in corporate legal form and, under the prevailing
legal system, it may not even be possible to distinguish between assets and liabilities owned by
them and other state-owned assets and liabilities. This starting point is also characterized by an
absence of legal infrastructure, including collateral and bankruptcy legislation defining debtors'
and creditors'  rights, little or no securities market activity, no system of private housing or other
specialized finance and little or no private insurance or pension activity. 9
7.  By contrast, the vision of the terminal point as seen by  leaders in transition economies
and their advisers  would be faniiliar to a European or American banker.'° It is characterized by
mainly private banks, with universal licenses, offering a wide range of sophisticated financial
products, supported by strong collateral, bankruptcy and other laws, publishing accounts on a
sophisticalted  basis acceptable under international standards. These banks are subject to Basle
Committee-based prudential standards enforced by an effective regulatory system administered
with some seriousness, normally by a modernized central bank.  The terminal point also involves
relatively deep and well-regulated securities markets, dealing in both government paper and
private debt and equity issues, as well as some significant level of specialized finance, private
insurance and pension activity.
8.  Ihis  is all well and good. However, our practical experience of transition thus far
suggests  that the journey  from "A" to "B" is scarcely a simple or well-mapped one which every
country will complete at the same speed, in the same sequence, or indeed with inevitability.
Thus, the broad and crisp consensus about how to characterize the starting and ending points of
7  The Gosbank  accounting  system  effectively  treated  banks  as if they  were in the business  of production  - in this
case,  producing  loans,  payments,  savings,  etc. The result  was a great emphasis  on the raw  statistics  of a bank's
current  operations,  with little or no information  on information  which was  relevant  generally  to the financial  health
of the institution,  such as capital,  income  or profitability,  let alone  risk.
'Banks in China  today would  be a relevant  and important  example  of this phenomenon.
Although,  prior to the break-up  of the formner  Soviet  Union, life, health,  disability  and  property insurance  was
available  through  the State-owned  monopoly  insurance  company  (Gosstrakh),  this system  was essentially  destroyed
by the effects of the post-Independence  inflation  in the FSU,  which  virtually  wiped  out all insurance  reserves.
"o  There  has of course  been active  debate  about whether  the terninal state of the sector should  be modeled
according  to the Japanese/German  model  or more  by reference  to a US system  (pre-1996).  However,  this debate
also fails  to throw much light on the nature,  pace and sequencing  of the transition  process  itself.
4transition, provides few, if any, insights about the nature, speed and sequencing of the transition
itself.  This gap in our knowledge is a serious problem.  Without such insights, how can we know
which public policy interventions are needed at any particular stage of the transition?  What are
the incentives operating at various points during this period and how do those incentives interact
with the interventions employed?  How should governments and external agencies respond to
"crises""  in the banking sector which occur while the transition is still on-going? In reality, thus
far, we have been able to do little more than assert that all institutional  and other differences
between the starting and ending points need to be resolved at some stage.  Thus, we have
concluded that for most countries on which we have worked, financial sectors in transition need
improved laws and accounting, better governance and risk management skills, stronger and less
political regulation and supervision, as well as a private sector customer base.  We have also
argued that some interventions, reflecting extensive institutional strengthening, should be started
early because they involve a long gestation period.' 2 But beyond this we have had little basis for
attaching priorities or a time sequence to possible interventions.  In reality,  decisions as to the
things done first have often reflected local political and other considerations -- such as the
presence of an energetic adviser in a key area --  as opposed to any consistent analytical
argument.
9.  To illustrate the proposition outlined above, consider the case of the typical early
transition bank, confronted with the typical efforts at financial sector reform we have seen thus
far.  With state ownership of both the bank and of the large majority of the bank's  borrowers, this
bank is arguably "safer'13 than a typical bank in a developed market economy.  The bank neither
knows nor probably cares that many of its clients would be categorized as poor credit risks under
market principles.  The information which would condition the behavior of a bank in a market
economy is of little importance, and financial information about its borrowers is of little or no
utility.  If its loans are not repaid, the bank is likely to be compensated by the budget.  Even if no
compensation is forthcoming, the resulting depletion of capital is of no concern, since Gosbank
accounting will fail to identify the problem.  Moreover,  as a state entity, the bank will not be
allowed to "fail" and, in any event, there are no mechanisms to enforce that "failure" even if it
"  There  are a number  of semantic  problems  raised  by the concepts  discussed  in this paper. Several  paradoxes
associated  with transitional  banking  can be explained  by noting that certain  familiar  technical  terms carry
connotations  (in common  parlance)  which  do not easily  translate  to the different  cultural  and incentive  structures  of
transitional  economies.  The precise  meaning  of the concept  of a "banking  crisis" is but one example.  Many
transition  banking systems  both in  the FSU and in major  countries  such as China are well-known  to include  major
banks  which are technically  insolvent. But it is now clear that  this situation  can persist  in stability  for many years
with none of the outward  and visible  signs  which  we normally  associate  with  "crisis" (e.g.  Indonesia  in 1998).  The
explanation  developed  later  in the paper is that because  the state  authorities  in early transition  economies  have
neither  the incentives  or the tools to act  against  such insolvent  banks,  a situation  with  all the features  of crisis is not
necessarily  associated  with  the imperative  to take action  immediately  i.e  with "crisis"  as we understand  it in
common  parlance.
12 While  logical,  even  these conclusions  may not reflect  the realities  of the transition  environment. In virtually  all
the transition  economies,  for example,  building  a modem  framework  and capacity  for supervising  banks  has been
amongst  the first priorities. Yet it remains  unclear  whether  such a framework  has, in all cases,  served  to reduce
systemic  risk, as desired,  and  provided  the foundation  for financial  sector  deepening. In some cases,  where  real
sector  reform  has lagged,  the additional  regulatory  framework  seems  to have served,  at least as effectively,  as a
vehicle  for political  domination  of ostensibly  private  banks, and a basis for the corrupt  sale of regulatory  favors  and
forbearancefsee  also  Annex 2].
13 The term "safe" is also  a semantic  minefield  in the context  of this paper.  Some  of the issues involved  in its
definition  are discussed  in footnote  16  below.
5were to occur. If this typical bank happens to have some household depositors, these depositors
know that the bank cannot fail and they thus have no need to withdraw their deposits to preserve
them.  As a result, they would have no interest in information that might cast light on the
portfolio or financial prospects of this bank. The asymmetric information which can cause
problematic behavior by depositors in a market economy is also of little importance.'4 Contagion
effects stemming from problems in any one individual bank are unlikely. Technical insolvency in
a large part of the banking sector can persist for long periods of time without creating serious
problems. The technical analysis and information to establish and reveal the problem is not in
place and the incentives of agents to respond is in any case limited. China's ability to escape the
recent financial turmoil in East Asia is a current and striking example of this point. No one
believes that China's banks are inherently sounder than those  in, say, South Korea or Japan. But,
because the control system in China is such that its banking problems do not easily show up,
there are no real mechanisms through which these problems easily translate into "crisis."  Nor,
indeed, are the incentives aligned in a way that are likely to motivate action." 5
10.  The hypothetical early transition bank described above is an integral part of the state
budgetary system, which explains the seeming paradox that a bank which may be deeply
insolvent generates none of the systemic dangers that would arise in a mature market economy." 6
Management failures and financial insolvency in such as bank  are no more a threat to the
stability of the financial system than would be similar problems arising in the case of a large,
state-run hospital.  Both, of course, have major implications for fiscal probity and so for
monetary stability, but not through the domino potential of runs on the banking system and other
contagion effects which are present in more mature banking systems.
11.  Although drawn in extreme terms, this example makes it obvious that a financial sector
comprised solely of "banks" functioning like that in our example, requires very little in the way
of public policy interventions to defend system stability. Such a system can be shown to be likely
to support excessive levels of investment and a poor allocation of that investment." 7 But the
14 Asymmetric information is generally argued to do its damage in this context by signaling that the known failure
of one bank may be indicative of more general failure in the system. Although a depositor has inadequate
knowledge to know which banks may fail after one initial failure, that lack of information may prompt the play-safe
strategy of withdrawing from all banks pending some clarification of the situation.  Hence a run on banks  is very
definitely a piroblem explicable in terms of asymmetric information.
15  The issue here is why would authorities in a country such as China where 40% or more of loans are non-
performing but there is no actual crisis, take the actions which might well set off such a crisis? A possible answer is
suggested in the next footnote.
16 It is nonetheless necessary, to question whether such banks can really be categorized as "safe." The suggestion
made is that wvhile  they may be safe for a time, as far as depositors are concerned, they are certainly very unsafe
from the perspective of taxpayers since there is a contingent liability somewhere in the future which is likely to fall
disproportionately on the taxpayer. Indeed, the gradually increased awareness of governments that losses on
directed credits will come to represent an unacceptable  burden on the budget may well be the trigger that forces
serious financial reform at some stage of the transition. Hungarian experience probably represents a good example
of this point but it is as yet harder to find good examples in the FSU. As much as anything, this example highlights
the fundamental blurring of the roles of individual taxpayer and household saver in the classic Socialist command
economy.
17 One demonstration of this point is that proposed by Paul Krugmann in terms of the so-called "Panglossian"
approach  to finance. This is the over-emphasis in the making of investment and credit decisions on the higher end
of the likely returns from such investments and the neglect of the expected or most likely rates of return. See for
example, P. Krugmann, "What happened to Asia" Krugmann website, January 1998.
6technical insolvency which would ring alarm bells in more mature banking systems is a
fundamentally different issue - of no real concern - in the early stages of the transition, and we
should recognize that reality. Equally, the preponderance in any banking system of such "banks"
should warn us that attempts to transplant institutions and regulatory approaches coming from
Western systems will, at best, be alien to the culture and incentives driving behavior in early
transition financial sectors.  Thus, a Western system of banking supervision will, at best, be alien
to transition banks and the authorities that oversee them.  Similarly, good collateral laws,
improved accounting standards (in banks or in their enterprise clients) might seem desirable but
can hardly be argued to represent priorities while the banking sector is of the type described.
Moreover, twinning arrangements and other forms of technical assistance designed to improve
banks' internal management and information systems are likely to fall on stony ground, precisely
because the governance and incentive structures in these banks provide no useful context for the
use of improved systems.
12.  The potential costs of a failure to take the local culture and incentive structure into
account in policy interventions are manifest as a waste of advisers' time, but can also be more
serious than this.  Without appropriate changes in incentives, the enforced adoption of the
foreign "cures" may  have serious negative consequences. For example, where the taxation of
bank profits is punitive, as is the case in many FSU countries, substantial negative consequences
flow from introducing greater transparency tllrough Western accounting and loan loss
provisioning techniques.  Complex prudential regulations and discretionary principles of bank
supervision can present new and lucrative opportunities for rent-seeking on the part of politicians
and bureaucrats, especially where social and legal controls on corrupt behavior have been
weakened in the transition." 8 Even the presence of modern collateral laws can have negative
consequences, where the judicial system remains weak and corrupt. 19
13.  The example given also hints at the difficulties which arise from emphasizing bank
privatization too early as a financial sector reform priority.  Not only is the franchise value of the
"bank" described above likely to be low, but the environment in which a newly-privatized
"bank" would be constrained to operate is hardly conductive to the formation of private banking
skills.  For example, the monitoring and risk-screening responsibilities which the mainstream
literature ascribes to banks is of little use when most of the bank's clients remain state-owned
enterprises, and they cannot easily be denied credit.  And underdeveloped accounting and
18  The actual  relationship  between  increasingly  sophisticated  regulations  and corruption  can be complex  and non-
linear. Prior to the transition,  for example,  there were  relatively  few  discretionary  decisions  vested in bank
regulators  which could be "sold"  to bankers. Immediately  after the break-up  of the FSU, the system  of enforcing
administrative  decisions,  like  so much else,  broke down and  bank regulators  had virtually  no power  to enforce  their
decisions,  which severely  curtailed  the "bribe value" of their discretion. Subsequently,  as legislation  and regulations
have  been modernized,  and the courts  become  more  reliable  enforcers  of regulatory  actions,  discretionary  regulatory
decisions  naturally  acquire  greater  value  and are more likely  to attract  improper  rent-seeking.
19 Transition  bankers  have been  quick to appreciate  that, in an environment  where  loan  repayment  is heavily
influenced  by politics  and other  similar  considerations,  conventional  collateral  is not an effective  risk control  device.
At the same  time,  the ability  of borrowers  to create  mortgages  and  other  security  interests  in favor of third parties
presents  banks  with serious  risks. The result has sometimes  been a defensive  strategy  by bankers,  designed  to
acquire  collateral  rights in all of an enterprise's  assets,  simply  to hold  other  creditors  at bay. As a result, enterprises
are prevented  from realizing  the full financing  value of their assets  and are hampered  in  the most efficient
management  of their business.
7supervisory systems do little to substitute for the politics of state ownership in checking
excessively self-interested exploitation of the opportunities afforded by a public banking license.
Under these circumstances, privatizing the bank does little to improve the quality of the banking
sector overall, and may open the door to seriously counterproductive behavior.
14.  A final introductory comment on the inadequacies of the conventional analysis of the
transition relates to the absence of linkages between the general macroeconomic prescriptions
offered by the IMF, the World Bank and others, and the impact of such actions on the financial
sector. The established asymmetric information literature makes it clear that contextual factors
like interest rates, exchange rates and structural reform can have a profound impact on the way
banks operate, as well as on their safety. 20  Yet in practice, the standard advice proffered by the
Bank and by others seems more or less insensitive to these insights.  Thus, stabilization and
liberalization of interest rates have invariably been advocated as two fixed points in early stage
financial reform.  The quality of these reforms is rarely discussed as a matter of major concern --
for example, are they consistent with real interest rates only temporarily out of line with long-
term sustainable levels?  This can be a serious blind spot, since a reform characterized by an
extended period of high real interest rates is a different animal from one which is not so
characterized. The former would be in direct conflict with the objective of building a stable
banking sector able to operate according to market principles. 2" Moreover, without the
development of a stable and growing banking system, the remonetization and monetary stability
of any economy is likely to remain elusive.  The framework outlined below attempts to deal with
this and other major problems of the conventional approach.
20 Thus, for example,  a major  rise in interest  rates  will invariably  intensify  the problems  of adverse  selection  -with
the worst borrowers  seeking  to borrow  more  and the best borrowers  seeking  to borrow  less  - as well as damaging
the balance  sheets  of borrowers.
21 It is clear from the asymmetric  information  framework  that any economy  forced  to operate  with high  positive  real
interest  rates for a lengthy  period  of time  is either  going  to finish  up with a very  unsound  banking system,  or
substantially  eliminate  banking  activities  involving  the channeling  of credits  to productive  enterprises.
8Section  III: The Main  Elements  of a New  Framework
15.  A schematic view of the proposed new framework in its simplest form is
presented in Figure 1. The (left side) vertical axis in the diagram refers to the
effectiveness of any given bank in gathering and processing information in a way that
reduces problems associated with adverse selection and moral hazard in its lending
decisions.  This capacity -referred to as Information Processing Capability in the
diagram - is a function of the individual bank's ability to collect and process information
about the economy in general and specific enterprises in a way that generates valid
conclusions of relevance to the banks profitability and risk profile.  The greater a bank's
capacity to deal with information in this way, the greater will be its ability to avoid bad
borrowers (adverse selection) and to screen and limit excessive risk-taking by those
borrowers which it does accept (moral hazard).
Figure  1: Banking  Sector  Risk  Frontier
High
Q  Low  Risk  Risk  Frontier.  -
UX
C.,
E  - High  Risk
1..~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ L  o 0
Low
Low  High
Sophistication  of Bank Products
16.  The horizontal axis represents a continuum of commercial banking activities and
products, with the operational complexity increasing cumulatively with moves to the
right along the axis.  The least demanding, such as providing directed credits to state-
owned enterprise or operating the payments system, fall to the far left on this axis and
require little information processing skills for the reasons given earlier. More
9sophisticated  activities  such as short - and medium-term  commercially  based lending,  long-term
commercial  lending  and foreign  exchange  activities  occupy  intermediate  positions. The most
demanding  banking  products,  including  project  finance,  derivative  instruments  and asset
securitization  would appear  at the far  right, in recognition  of the special skills  and information
needed  to engage  in these activities.
17.  The Risk Frontier  identifies  that level of information  processing  capability  required  to
engage  in an activity  having  a given level of sophistication  without  incurring  an unreasonable
level of risk. Where  the informational  requirements  of a specific  activity  exceed  the
informational  processing  capabilities  of the bank undertaking  this activity,  we can conclude  that
the bank will expose  itself to unreasonable  risk, since  the outcome  of this activity  will be
dependent  on risk factors  the bank is unable  to analyze  and achieve  reasonable  protection
against.  For these purposes,  an "unreasonable  risk" means,  for any given  activity,  risk in excess
of that level consistent  with the long term expected  profitability  of that activity.  The curvature  of
the risk frontier  presumes  that any bank needs  a cumulatively  greater  information  processing
capability  in order  to engage  in progressively  more sophisticated  banking  activities.
18.  lThe  precise  shape of the Risk Frontier  can be a matter of debate and empirical
verification. For the purposes  of this initial articulation,  the assumption  is made that, in moving
from the essentially  passive  role as the follower  of government  directions  into lending  on a
commercial  basis, a relatively  significant  increase  in banking  skills  and information  processing
infrastructure  is needed,  resulting  in a steeper  slope  of the Risk Frontier. As these initial skills
are mastered,  however,  and the information  processing  infrastructure  is put into place,  the
incremenlal  sophistication  needed  to move further  out on the continuum  of product  complexity  is
less, resulting  in a lesser slope  of the Risk  Frontier  in those  regions.
19. The location  andposition  of the Risk Frontier  depends  on a set of factors  which,  taken
together,  determine  the quality  of the operating  environment  for banks,  which contributes  to the
overall  "riskiness"  of banking. The individual  factors  which  comprise  this environment  are
external  to individual  banks and so outside  the banks' direct  control. They  are, however,  closely
reflective  of policy interventions  urged on the government  by the IMF, the World Bank and other
advisors,  designed  to guide  the economy's  passage  through  the transition. In general  terms, these
factors  include  the legal infrastructure  (property  rights,  contract  enforcement,  central  and
commercial  banking  laws, collateral  and banking  laws),  macroeconomic  conditions  (interest  rate
levels,  stability  of interest  rates, exchanges  rates and prices generally),  structural  reform
(privatization,  de-monopolization)  and reform  in banking  regulation  (prudential  regulations,
supervision,  accounting).  In addition,  the quality  of commercial  relationships,  or the degree  of
trust which has generally  built up between  commercial  counterparts,  is an important  factor,
particularly  in the early  transition,  with the severe  dislocation  of traditional  trade and business
relationships  which  exists at that time.
20.  As with the shape of the Risk Frontier,  the impact  of a specific  environmental  factor  on
its location and  position can be a matter  of empirical  verification. In general  terms, however,  for
any given factor,  where  that factor operates  to increase  the risk of banking  operations,  it also
increases  the need for information  processing,  to control  the risk. Thus, for example,  high real
interest  rates, undeveloped  business  laws and significant  privatization  all contribute  to
10unpredictability  in the condition  of enterprise  borrowers,  which  can only be controlled  by the
banks processing  more information  about  those borrowers. 22 In terms of our analysis,  these
factors  all contribute  to a higher position  of the Risk Frontier,  which has the effect of placing
more  banks into the high risk area, at least  until their information  processing  capabilities
increase. Similarly,  a low real and stable interest  rate regime,  predictable  and enforceable  laws
and government  ownership  of (and support  for) enterprises,  will all be reflected  in less
information  processing  needs and thus a lower  position  of the Risk Frontier.
21.  The concepts  introduced  in broad  terms  in Figure I can be applied  to analyze  individual
banks as well as entire  banking  sectors. Figure  2, for example,  presents  the risk  profile of a
specific  bank (Bank  A), operating  in a transition  economy. The location  of the Risk Frontier  is
again determined  by economy-wide  factors  outside  the control  of Bank  A. Figure  2 also
contains  an indication,  along  the horizontal  axis, of various specific  products  with increasing
sophistication.  The shaded  regions  (which  are calibrated  by reference  to the right  hand axis of
the diagram)  indicate  the volume  of each such  product,  as a proportion  of the total business
conducted  by the bank. The point where  Bank  A's level of information  processing  capability  -
indicated  by the horizontal  line labeled  "Bank A"-  intersects  with the Risk Frontier  defines  bank
A's "product limit": that is, the maximum  product  sophistication  Bank  A can deliver,  at that
stage without  incurring  undue  risk. To the extent  Bank  A elects  nevertheless  to deliver  products
beyond  this limit, these products  will entail  "excessive" risk 23. The magnitude  of this excessive
risk is indicated  by the area labeled  "Bank  A: High Risk  Activity." This area  is a combination  of
the number  of Bank  A's products  which  are beyond  its information  processing  capabilities  and
the volume of such products. Overall,  the relationship  of this high risk area  to the corresponding
low risk area gives some  indication  of the overall  risk profile  of Bank  A, in the given
environment.  Note, in this connection,  that policy  interventions  which, as noted above,  operate
to shift the Risk Frontier  upwards  and to the left will also shift Bank  A's product  limit to the left,
which will have the effect  of increasing  the volume  of high risk activity  and the overall  riskiness
of Bank  A's operations.
22  A recent and dramatic example has been the hike in interest rates in Russia and Ukraine in June 1998 to nominal
levels of over 10% and real levels of 60% or more. Independently on any success that banks may have achieved in
improving their risk management skills, these interest rate hikes have definitely exposed the Russian and Ukrainian
banks to increased risks.
23 This is a matter of degree rather than absolutes and the competence of Bank A must be assessed relatively to some
norms of good practice. Thus in relation to the higher risk products, it is not that Bank A is completely incompetent
to deliver them but merely that its level of information processing competence is weak relative to the norm.
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22.  Figure 3 applies this approach to the entire banking or financial sector of which Bank A
is merely one part.  Each "X" represents one bank; the location of each bank reflecting the bank's
information processing capability and the weighted average sophistication of the bank's product
mix, as indicated by analysis of the type shown in Figure 2.  The overall riskiness of the sector
depicted.  is a function of: (i) the number of banks in the "High Risk" zone, (ii) how far below the
Risk Frontier each of those banks is, and (iii) the relative share of banking activity represented by
those banks.
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23.  The translation of the data for an individual bank in Figure 2 to Figure 3 is outlined as
follows.  Any bank having zero high risk activity as defined in Figure 2 is located above the risk
frontier of Figure 3 at a position corresponding to its most sophisticated product.  Any bank
having high risk activity as defined in Figure 2 is located below the risk frontier of Figure 3.  The
distance below the frontier is a function of the high: low risk ratio as defined by the shaded areas
in Figure 2.  The location in the horizontal dimension depends on the most sophisticated product
offered by that bank.
24.  By way of summary we can note that, in principle at least, the diagram can locate any
bank in a system  in terms of (a) its own internal information and information processing
capabilities; (b) the sophistication of the banking products it attempts to offer (both on the asset
and the liability side of its balance-sheet); and  (c) the external operating environment which
contributes to the riskiness of particular banking activities/products. At any point in the
transition, if banks are predominantly located above the prevailing risk frontier, we can assert
that the banking system is "safe" . But if the opposite applies then the system is "unsafe" in that
most banks are not adequately insulated from the dangers arising from informational problems
which can cause excessive risk-taking. Financial sector "transition" is a difficult concept
precisely because it involves substantial and largely unpredictable changes in all THREE
dimensions: the position of the risk frontier, the products offered, as well as the information
capacities of banks.
25.  But Figures 1-3 provide only a static representation of the situation of banks and the
banking sector as a whole.  To apply our framework of analysis to the transition, one further
13dimension.  - time - must be accounted for, to reflect changes in the banking sector as the many
elements of the transition unfold. Fortunately, these many elements can be represented in the
three dimensions of change summarized in paragraph 24. During the transition, these three
dimensiorns  can be expected to evolve along the following lines.
1.  The Information Processing Capabilities of individual banks should  increase as
banks build their human capital through education and training, build operating
experience, hire new staff and establish joint ventures and other alliances with
external partners from economies with more developed banking systems.  This
increase in capability will also involve  the installation of computer and other
operational systems to handle areas such as accounting, asset/liability management
and credit analysis.  Simultaneously, more information will become available to
banks  through developments such as enterprise accounting reformn,  the
liberalization of prices, privatization and de-monopolization.  As any individual
bank implements these changes, its position on our diagram will move directly
upwards on the vertical axis of our sector diagram.  Other things remaining equal,
this movement will tend to bring the bank from areas of higher risk into areas of
lower risk.
2.  As reform takes hold in the economy, a greater variety of banking products  and
services will be offered by banks to their customers. Developments such as
universal banking, which, intentionally or not, is becoming the norm in most
transition economies, will significantly increase this product range.  Typically, as
new products are added to a bank's portfolio, greater demands are placed on the
bank to design and manage these new products in ways which adequately control
their risk. This product widening effect, other things remaining equal, is reflected in
our diagram by a move of the bank to the right on the horizontal axis, again into
areas of higher risk.
26.  The combined effects of factors 1 and 2, above, will, over time, tend to move a specific
bank from the lower left corner of the diagram towards the upper right corner, with the speed and
precise direction of this movement determined by the character of the business development and
institutional development strategies adopted by the institution. The optimal approach, of course,
for a bank  seeking long-term success/survival in the sectore 4 would be to combine these two
strategies in such a way as to keep the bank above, but as close to the Risk Frontier as possible.
Figure 4a depicts this movement over time for each individual bank in the diagram with an
arrow, which reflects the combined effects of these two factors.
4 This qualification reflects the common observation that many banks, particularly in the early stages of the transition, were established not to
engage in tradlitional banking activity, but to serve either as the treasury function of their enterprise founders or to gain access to state subsidies
distributed through the banking sector.  In  our diagram, such banks would tend to remain clustered in the lower left corner of the diagram, at
least until advances in sector reform forces them either to liquidate or adopt a more conventional banking business strategy.
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27.  The third dimension reflected in our diagrams, the operating environment, is indicated by
the shape and position of the Risk Frontier, under the influence of factors such as those described
in paragraphs 19-20, above.  Although the overall long term impact of these various factors over
time may tend to shift the Risk Frontier upwards while also flattening the slope of the curve, this
evolution is by no means certain or monotonic.  Most  environmental factors associated with
reform can have complex effects on the risks faced by banks. The combined effect of changes in
several of these factors is likely at best to be unpredictable or even counter- intuitive.  Thus, for
example, the implementation of modem banking laws and prudential/supervisory regulations will
initially raise the Risk Frontier by restricting the less information-intensive strategies, such as
insider and connected lending, which, in the early transition, are the safer banking strategies (See
Sections IV and V below for a fuller explanation). Similarly, the liberalization of prices, trade,
etc. exposes banks to the need, formerly absent, to do a serious job of processing information in
order to distinguish good from bad credit risks. Any parallel liberalization of credit gives banks
the freedom, also formerly absent, to offer a greater variety of differentiated products. Thus both
types of liberalization can be seen as exogenous sources of increased risk to banks.  By contrast,
the effective implementation of collateral and bankruptcy laws can lower the Risk Frontier,
making banking generally safer, by substituting reliable legal relationships for borrower-specific
business information.
28.  In general, it may be said that, over the long term course of the transition, as an economy
moves away from the inefficient yet predictable command structure into the efficient chaos of the
market, the Risk Frontier rises and flattens, as greater information processing demands are placed
on all banks. However, the short term perturbations around this longer term trend may be very
considerable as individual  -components of reform change the environment in which banks need to
work and so the risks to which they are exposed.
29.  Figure 4b depicts our hypothetical banking system after it has emerged successfully
from the, possibly long and probably turbulent, Transition, with a smaller number of banks now
clustered in a smaller low risk area just above the Risk Frontier, which has shifted substantially
15higher and to the left. 25 "Non-bank" banks, speculators and other businesses are no longer in the
sector, the pressures of modem regulation and supervision and market competition have driven
them out and selected as survivors the banks which were willing and able to build their
information processing capabilities to the degree necessary to control the added risks of
operating inl  a market environment with a differentiated product mix.  However, there is neither
inevitability nor smoothness about the transit from the situation depicted in  Figure 4a to that
shown in  Figure 4b.  The factors we have described could easily conspire to keep individual
banks or even whole banking sectors in something like the "Early Transition" state depicted in
Figure 4a. The fascination of the transition in the FSU even seven years after it all began, is that
we still observe a great variety of country experiences covering most of the spectrum from 4a
through to 4b.
30.  Having  presented  a  framework of  analysis  for  better  understanding  the  impact  of
specific actions and interventions on the banking system in transition, the next section seeks to
apply this  framework to  generate several general propositions  about banking in the transition
environmeant
Section IV:  Three Propositions about Banking in Transitional Economies
31.  The framework as presented in Figures 1 - 4 is clearly a schematic which needs
refinement if it is to have operational significance. But even at this rudimentary stage, we can
apply the logic we have developed to explore some features of transitional banking and see that
these might be such as to confound, possibly even invalidate,  the advice coming from a more
traditional basis of analysis. As we shall see in Section V many aspects of banking behavior in
the transition are divergent from the familiar textbook approaches to risk management. These
differences provide some justification for our assertion that transition  financial systems need to
be analyzed as something other than primitive versions of market based systems.
32.  Let us illustrate this  with three simple but important propositions suggested by the
framework.
Transitiornl  banking systems do not need the full menu of Western-inspired institutional and
infrastructure reforms to be "safe."
33.  The framework makes  it clear that a transition banking system may be quite safe from
many points of view 26 even though it has progressed only a small way through the menu of
reforms which the Bank typically advises to client countries. This could happen because the
majority oL  banks may not be trying to deliver products having any great informational
sophistication - hence banks collectively are unlikely to make the mistakes which typically lead
to systemic banking crises in mature market economies. Indeed, the framework suggests that
such problems can only arise when banks attempt to deliver products which exceed the
25 The  leftward  movement  is explained  by  the  gradual  disappearance  of the  typical  banking  products  of the  central
planning  era which  involve  low  risk and low information  processing  requirements:  e.g. directed  credits.
26 This  proposition  again confronts  the semantic  problem  referred  to earlier.  The explanation  given in footnote  13
above  is once again  relevant.
16sophistication of their own information capacities and for any given external environment.
Alternatively, it could occur because the quality of general macro and other reforms is such as to
leave the risk frontier at a relative low position.
Transition banking system "safety" may be disrupted by numerous factors having nothing
to do with the quality of bank performance.
34.  The framework also makes it clear that the safety of a transitional banking system is an
elusive and potentially highly changeable concept. It can be either enhanced or diminished by
reforms, or other environmental changes which are not directly related to the banking sector. For
example the freeing of foreign exchange rates or interest rates is likely to shift the Risk Frontier
upwards and push at least some, otherwise safe, banks into the high risk zone where their
informational capabilities are lagging behind the needs of the new and possibly more turbulent
environment. Above all there is nothing particularly concrete about the concept of a "good"
bank. "Transition" is often presented as a discrete period of time through which transition
economies will inevitably pass. Our framework suggests that this is a gross over-simplification.
The process is in fact fraught with pitfalls (significant between-period pivoting of the risk
frontier of our analytical figures)  and there are a whole host of factors which can create dangers
for a supposedly "safe" banking system even when it has progressed a long way down the road to
transition. Bank "safety" is defined by a complex interaction between the informational
capacities of a bank, its ambitions as regards the sophistication and riskiness of the products it
offers, and the external environment in which it needs to operate.
Transition itself can damage the health of a banking system.
35.  The third insight is that during the early stages of transition, banks are likely to face
powerful incentives to move into increasingly sophisticated banking activities, without
necessarily introducing the corresponding improvements in their information processing
capabilities. This is because the declining interest margins and tight monetary controls that
typically accompany inflation stabilization (a standard early component of reform), put pressures
both on bank liquidity and on earnings. Premature product diversification offers attractive
sources of temporary liquidity relief and prospective new sources of earnings. We have already
seen many examples of this in the FSU -- both actual diversification and wholly unrealistic ideas
for product diversification in  many small inexperienced banks in the region.  The risks
associated with these new products (e.g. the promissory notes which created serious problems for
Russian banks in 1996 or the recklessly generous deposit interest rates in Albania and Latvia)
receive limited attention, ex ante, from inexperienced regulators, and their Western advisers,
because of a lack of understanding of the risks. Equally new product opportunities may seem to
confront poorly informed managers with new opportunities for profit (and personal enrichment,
given weak regulation). Also, while objective information is poor, the desire to "keep up with the
Joneses" may also motivate product diversification. In Bulgaria, for example, it is suggested that
product diversification by the Sperbank was motivated by a desire to bolster lagging profitability
and to ensure that the bank remained in the frame for possible privatization. But let us be clear
that the stabilizing reforms which the IMF, the World Bank and other donors advocate are also
an important part of the pressure for banks to move to the right along the horizontal axis without,
necessarily, any movement along the vertical axis The result is that  significantly more banks
17may locate themselves on the high risk side of the risk frontier. Other World Bank and EBRD
products such as credit lines typically pressure banks to move in both the horizontal direction
(i.e. more complex  products), and the vertical direction (i.e. more effective information
processing;  to address the extra risks). Hence their effect on safety system depends on the relative
strengths of these two types of pressure.
36.  In practical terms this suggests that external advisers might commit more time to
advising countries about how to monitor and restrict banks from the premature moves into more
sophisticated banking products. This could be a useful complement to our efforts to achieve an
early and general adoption of Western standards of bank supervision, regulation etc.  It would
also require resistance, on the part of advisors, to the notion that more sophisticated financing
products - such as long-term lending -- are needed early on in the transition, to anticipate the
capital financing needs of the emerging private sector.
Part V:  The Reality of Banking in Transitional Economies
37.  In this Section we expand on these three main points by examining a sample of six aspects
of banking and regulatory behavior and performance in transition economies through the lens of
the analytical framework outlined above. The purpose is to show that these aspects of behavior,
which might be regarded merely as cultural curiosities if analyzed in a traditional Western
manner, turn out to be rather more rational when examined by reference to our proposed
framework.
38.  Politics.  Political factors intrude far more prominently on banking in the FSU than in
more mature systems. In the early stages of transition of the FSU, these factors overwhelm more
traditional business and financial concerns in assessing the creditworthiness of state-owned
enterprises  -- a highly significant category of borrower for banks until privatization and related
structural reforms are much further along.  We need to recognize that this discourages the growth
of essential credit analysis and risk assessment skills in general, but encourages the nurturing of
closer bank relationships with the politicians and bureaucrats who control the fate of these
enterprises. In practical terms, bankers find their points of safety in our diagram initially through
these political relationships rather than by developing the technical credit monitoring and other
information processing skills. Indeed these skills are likely to be regarded as an unnecessary
luxury.  Political influences on the application of sanctions by banking regulators also place a
premium on the establishment of  cozy but non-commercial relationships between bankers and
politicians.  The reluctance of politicians to apply sanctions against banks which are in trouble
until the last possible moment is thereby intensified and, in its turn, encourages excessive risk-
taking when banks first encounter financial difficulties and unregulated asset stripping when the
insiders realize that a bank's continued viability is in jeopardy.
39.  Banking Infrastructure.  The quality of financial and other business information
available from current and potential borrowers in a typical FSU country, in any case, is often
insufficient for a reasonable creditworthiness analysis. This places  a premium on personal and
other relationships in the loan approval process. The large Financial Industrial Groups (FIGs)
which are particularly powerful in Russia are merely the extreme example of this proposition.
18The maturity mismatches associated with the typical FIG set-up is a spectacular example of the
associated risks (e.g. very short term deposit and other liabilities contrasted with assets consisting
of large holdings of unlisted shares in associated companies - shares which are highly illiquid in
principle but also because of shareholder or employee resistance to their possible sale). 27
Widespread deficiencies in the legal infrastructure for banking, particularly in the laws governing
collateral and bankruptcy, mean that the banker cannot reliably look to the courts to recover loan
losses. The preference for insider arrangements may mean in reality that banks are likely to be
located further to the lower right on Figure 1 relative to any given risk frontier. The deficiency of
a reliable legal framework means that the risk frontier itself  is located (pivoted) quite a long
way to the upper left, thereby exposing more  banks to substantially more  risk than would
otherwise arise. As a practical matter, the FSU banks have tried to compensate for these dangers
by adopting risk management strategies based on direct control over a borrower's transaction
balances. 28 While personal guarantees by shareholders and other collateral is often required by
banks - more as a cosmetic measure than for their intrinsic value - it is control over the "jugular
vein" of the borrower's own bank balance that creates leverage for the lender. 29 Unfortunately,
this has the major downside effect of severely limiting competition among banks since it often
precludes clients from holding accounts in more than one bank. In terms of  IMF and World
Bank policy advice it is difficult to see how the standard requirement for more competitive or
contestable banking can be squared with the understandable desire of the transitional bankers to
use controls such as this to defend their  own financial soundness .
40.  The Taxation of Banks.  Official hostility to the notion of banking as a respectable
business has been reflected in several FSU countries by the excessive taxation of bank profits, as
well as in a generally hostile relationship between bankers and bureaucrats. This attitude prompts
bankers to conceal profits and to collude with corrupt officials to move as much income as
possible off the official books. Tax laws which unreasonably limit or even prohibit deductions
for establishing loan loss provisions and write-offs effectively penalize sound accounting,
encouraging banks to persist with the inaccurate classification of loans and the associated ever-
greening of loans to distressed borrowers. Under this regime, bankers have little or no incentive
to adopt internationally accepted accounting standards; modern portfolio and management
information systems; or business methods to improve the monitoring of transactions between the
head office and bank branches. In other words banks have an incentive not to advance too far
along the vertical axis of Figure 1 even though the incentives to advance in the horizontal plane
may be considerable. Many of the technical "improvements" which Western external advice
presents as unambiguously desirable, are viewed by bankers as actions which serve primarily to
make the results of their operations more transparent, thereby subjecting a greater proportion of
their income to taxation, and other forms of bureaucratic attack.
27 Similarly,  much of the lending  by the banks  in a FIG  group  is more like  an equity  investment  than a credit
because  of the willingness  to accept  the up-side  gains but not to liquidate  loans  when they fail.
28  By this we mean the right enjoyed  by the banks  (and often  shared  with  tax inspectorates)  to unilaterally  debit  the
bank account  of a  client in the event  that  payments  that  are due are not in fact  made. This  is derivative  from old
Soviet  practices  where arbitrary expropriation  of bank accounts  was quite  common.
29 Even in Russia,  where  banking  is thought  to be fairly  sophisticated,  money  in banks is still  not freely convertible
into cash  and the tax administration  still  enforces  the principle  of one bank-one  account  on many taxpayers.
1941.  The Impact of the Lack of Financial Discipline on Competition.  In many FSU
countries, the real competitors of banks -- particularly for the business of state-owned enterprises
-- are not other banks.  They are state-owned energy suppliers, the tax collector, unpaid workers
and other enterprises.  It is to these informal sources of finance that many enterprises turn first .
They are preferred to banks because obtaining credit is simple, even automatic, much of the
financing is pragmatically considered to be grants - expected to be forgiven in later structural
reforms - and that part which is not a grant typically carries no interest burden.  The
attractiveness of informal borrowing is further enhanced, in the absence of interest payments, as
inflationl  reduces the real purchasing power of the underlying liability. While these problems can
be a concern in many countries, the special issue of the FSU is the very large magnitudes of these
informal financing channels relative to the more formal channels, including banks. 31 The large
magnitudes and wide usage of informal credit severely undermines the competitive position of
"serious" banks. It also contributes further to the degrading of customary methods of credit
analysis and other traditional techniques of selecting borrowers, in favor of "relationship"
banking where shareholdings (by borrowers) or other connections give bankers some edge in
terms of information and customer access relative to their competitors. Bankers who select their
borrowers in this way have little use for technical assistance in credit analysis and asset
management: i.e., little incentive to move upwards on the vertical axis of Figure 1.
42.  Banking  Supervision.  Substandard supervision, flowing from the weak content and
limited enforceability of regulations, as well as from the qualifications, the resources and  the
uncertain political mandate of bank examiners, has contributed to a generally adversarial
relationship between FSU bankers and their regulators.  Western banking accepts the regulatory
system as a necessary and even positive mechanism to reduce both individual and systemic risk
for banks, and the independence of regulators is almost always a sine qua non.  In the FSU, this
culture cf acceptance of regulation and supervisory independence is lacking and most bankers
feel relatively little compunction in evading regulatory requirements.  For their own part, FSU
banking regulators have had trouble shedding the "command and control" mentality of the old
Soviet system, which emphasized literal obedience to rules designed to cover all contingencies,
in favor of market-based regulatory systems, which require the exercise of discretion and a
basically cooperative relationship with banks. 32 All these factors, combined with inadequate
accountinig,  permit a ubiquitous evasion of prudential regulations, especially those limiting
connected lending, loan concentration, excessively risky transactions and the payment of
dividends without profits. In other words, even the better systems of bank supervision in the FSU
have fouad it difficult to prevent the premature moves to riskier positions (the rightward moves
along the horizontal axis of Figure 1). One result among others has been the rapid emergence of
30 The existence  of such forms  of financing  is not necessarily  an indication  of a poorly  managed  enterprise. The
best managers  would  naturally  be expected  to mine  these cost-effective  sources  of finance aggressively,  as would
less  talented  managers,  who  may simply  be forced  into a similar  strategy  through lack of revenue.
3  For example,  at the end of 1996,  inter-enterprise  arrears  in Ukraine  amounted  to more  than Hr.70 billion  ( $38
billion). This compared to total bank credit outstanding of only Hr. II billion ( $5 billion).
32 The general failure to require public disclosure of bank financial information, in which Estonia and Moldova are
noteworthy and model exceptions, means that regulators cannot enlist in support of their efforts an important ally --
the public - to identify and isolate poorly run and poorly performing institutions.  The result has been a general loss
of confidence in banks, even where there are examples of small, well-run institutions which merit the support of the
public.  Embracing public disclosure of this sort would also take some of the pressure away from the deposit
insurance debate and  help to de-politicize the process of banking supervision.
20high-risk "pocket" and "zero" banks which are little more that the treasury operations of one or a
few enterprises, yet which are, in some countries, still permitted to receive deposits from the
public and participate in the national payments system and the inter-bank market. 33
43.  Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard.  The difficult issue of deposit insurance
continues to elude resolution across the FSU.  Until economic recovery provides  governments
with some budgetary "breathing room," it is hard to see how the inherent tension between the
political desire to protect all household depositors and public resource limitations can be
resolved.  Until then, the situation is likely to be driven more by politics than by law.  Defacto
deposit insurance for household deposits, at a minimum, is probably assumed by the public in
most countries, official pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding.  Certainly, the state's
continued ownership interests in  many FSU banks and its direct political involvement in many
more,  gives credence to this assumption. And the experiences with the three Baltic banking
crises in the 1993-96 period confirms the political assumption that governments, in practice, have
a hard time resisting broad-based depositor protection, in the absence of more limited laws. 34
44.  For FSU and indeed bankers in other countries, the presence of defacto  deposit
insurance is significant partly for the familiar theoretical reason that it dilutes their concerns
about the level of risk to which they are willing to expose depositors' funds.  But in addition, it
creates  a less direct, but equally troubling incentive.  If there is a political imperative  to protect
depositors, there is a substantial likelihood that governments and central banks will bail out the
larger  troubled banks, or at least defer the decision to close and liquidate those banks as long as
possible.  This creates a strategy for bankers' self-preservation in bidding up deposit rates in an
effort to capture enough household deposits to make the bank "too big to fail" politically.  A
particularly egregious example of this strategy can be seen in the history of Latvia's  Bank
Baltija, the central actor in that country's recent banking crisis.  With real deposit rates
approaching 90% in 1993/94 an enormous percentage of the entire system's deposits flowed to
this bank and, as a result, the government was reluctant to take decisive action when the bank
proved to be insolvent. This lost a  valuable period of time, during which it appears that virtually
all the bank's  assets disappeared.
45.  The above list of "perversities" is not complete, nor can it be.  It does, however, give
some indication of the forces which devalue what we would see as "good" banking behavior and
"good" banking skills, and place a premium on  a wholly different set of skills which would
ordinarily be irrelevant -- if not punishable -- in a more traditional, market-oriented banking
system. All these non-standard modes of behavior are amenable to interpretation in the light of
the information-processing framework which we propose. Once we begin to see things through
this lens, we can also understand the problems that arise because the interventions supported by
3  A number  of countries  have made  important  progress  in limiting  the licenses  of existing  banks, it should  be noted,
including  Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Georgia  and Uzbekistan. Where  these  pocket and zero  banks can be isolated
from household  deposits,  the inter  bank market,  the payments  system  and access  to central  bank credit,  however,
they can serve as a useful  resource  for enterprises,  and  even industrial  groups,  which  require  banking  services  to
survive,  yet represent  excessively  high credit  risk  for "ordinary"  banks.
3  Estonia  and Moldova  are the only examples  in the FSU  where  a clear decision  was made  to allocate  some
of the losses in an insolvent  bank  to depositors,  but even in Estonia,  protection  was provided  to other
depositors  in other  banks. In contrast,  Latvia  and Lithuania  are examples  of a quick,  political  decision  to
provide  full protection,  even  where  it was not legally  required.
21the IMF. the World Bank and other donors are sometimes contrary to the commercial interests of
both the bankers, and their ultimate regulators -the government. This is in marked contrast with
the Wesl:  where legal and regulatory systems are broadly consistent with both private and public
interests. 35 The examples also suggest that the balance between the need  for informational
processing skills (to manage and monitor risks), and the bankers' command and use of such
skills, is likely to evolve extremely unevenly as economic transition itself proceeds. The
technical assistance provided by the Western advisers needs to recognize this and to do far more
than merely explain and try to inculcate "good" practice. It also needs to be sensitive to the pros
and cons of the pre-existing "bad" practices of FSU bankers, and also of some possible dangers
to banking stability of the premature abandonment of such practices. Perversely, we may need to
temporarily defend some "undesirable" practices in the interests of defending system stability.  In
many cases, the reality of the FSU "market place" is that behavior which may be seen as prudent
and low risk under traditional notions of banking in the West, may expose banks to even greater
risks in the FSU environment.  These drivers of behavior should be taken more fully into account
in consicdering,  for example, the restructuring of state-owned banks, as well as in the basic
design of banking system regulation itself.
Section VI: Public Policy  Support for Banking  Sector Development
46.  The analytical framework developed in this paper  leads to several conclusions of
relevance to the effective design and sequencing of  support for financial sector development in
the FSU. These conclusions are articulated for the moment mainly from a World Bank
perspective. However, most of what is said has relevance also to the policy interventions
supported by the IMF, the EBRD and other external agencies.  Although conclusions about some
policy interventions may be self evident and uncontroversial,  our approach which focuses
explicitly on the nature of the transition (rather than its beginning and ending points) nonetheless
provides a fresh focus on particular po]icies. Hopefully this can be useful in fine-tuning well
established approaches such as the use of credit lines. Other conclusions about other forms of
policy intervention are more controversial and we would expect them to be the subject of robust
debate to assess their validity.
47.  The first and most important point revealed by the analysis is that the  reform  of the
financial  sector of any FSU country certainly has to be regarded as a  jong-term  project. The
cultural, attitudinal and incentive factors which constitute the main differences between Western
and Soviet banking are not amenable to quick fixes. Additionally, the three main influences on
the structure and safety of a sector ( bank informational capacities; the sophistication of the
banking products being offered; and the external environment which conditions the location of
the risk frontier), will all change significantly but, in some cases slowly,  as transition proceeds.
This complicates any attempt to assess the health of the system at any stage or to locate it on
some linear time chart of progress towards reform.  Furthermore, the nature and pace of change
is hard to predict; it is also partly endogenous depending on the stance of policy; and, in the case
of the third of the influences listed above, the changes will inconveniently go in different
directions at different stages of the transition: sometimes helping to strengthen banks and at other
3  It bears noting  that this long list  of obstacles  does not mean  there are no good  bankers in  the FSU. Plainly  there
are, and  they can be found in every country. Yet it must also be conceded  that  they can be found  relatively  easily
because  they stand  out so far from the average.
22times damaging their safety. So apparent "successes " in the short term are almost certain to be
followed by some subsequent reversals. The message for the World Bank is that it should dig in
and  provide assistance to the sectoral reform project on a long-term basis (Caprio and Klingebiel
arguing from another perspective suggest at least 10 years).
48.  We should also not be surprised by uneven progress during that period.  We need to
build a deep understanding of what is actually happening - with bank incentives, clients
performance, the political-banking nexus etc. - and how we can best nudge the system slowly in
the right direction. We also need to use our analytical skills to  anticipate and be ready to ride
with the reversals which are an inevitable part of the transition process. This is the World Bank's
main comparative advantage in working on the sector. Other donors, by contrast, will be looking
for partial involvement and may want to assess the success of their assistance against relatively
narrow criteria and on a short time frame. The Bank is the one international institution that might
be able to take the longer term and more strategic view that the reform process definitely calls
for. To the extent that it can do so, it will also win a disproportionate voice in the policy debate
and possibly earn the right to help coordinate and sequence the inputs provided by other donors.
49.  A related point is that the infrastructural reforms (improved banking supervision,
collateral reform, IAS accounting etc) which we typically and rightly advocate, have long
gestation periods.  But, more important than the delays is the fact that the effectiveness of these
reforms is only as good as the underlying culture and incentives of the system allow them to be.
The reason is that the establishment of the new systems cannot of itself make for stronger banks.
It is the enforcement of good systems on the banks that achieves this. But enforcement will not
happen if the incentives and culture of banks and regulators are inimical to the necessary actions.
This has several implications for the work of the World Bank. One is that we should not expect
too much from the new institutions we help to create,  at least in the short term.  We should
certainly not assume that, from day one, these will share the cultural attitudes which we bring
from our own mature market economies - these have to be built slowly and founded on a
significant consensus of public and political support before the necessary enforcement will
actually happen. 36  A second implication is that we can help to shape incentives if we package
the reforms we propose appropriately. A good example, relates to the early reform of the taxation
system for banks, including a generous treatment of loan-loss provisions as a critical incentive to
get banks to produce more realistic accounts. 37
36  An analogy  which  may make this point  clearer  is with attitudes  to corruption  in different  countries.  In the USA
and most other Westem  countries,  there is a huge  public  intolerance  of corruption  by public  officials  and a broad
consensus  that even  minor infringements  of codes  of behavior  should  attract  severe punishment  as well as various
degrees  of public  humiliation.  In the FSU,  by contrast,  the culture  for  the moment  is one of passive  tolerance  of
even  huge corruption  with public  revelations  of malpractice  causing  little  apparent inconvenience  to those who
stand accused. As a consequence  the unfortunate  officials  charged  with detecting  and  prosecuting  corrupt  officials
can rely on almost  no consensus  of public  support  for their actions,  and little  help from politicians.  Even leading
edge anti-corruption  laws in this environment  would  do little good.  Vide leading-edge  laws on the regulation  of
banks.
3  It is conceded  that this is a controversial  point.  Good bankers  assert  that full provisioning  should  be done for
reasons  of sound risk  management  and not because  it is seen  to have  tax advantages.  Tax specialists  argue that if
unrealized  capital  gains are not taxed  than unrealized  capital  losses  should  not receive  tax exemptions.  There is no
elegant  response  to these  arguments  - only  the pragmatic  point  that  transition  bankers  have shown  an aversion  to
full provisioning  and they may need  a bribe in  the form of a tax break to get them  to accept  the idea.
2350.  A particular  aspect of the long lead time needed for new institutions to become
effective relates to the restructuring of problem banks.  Embryonic systems of bank regulation,
and inoxperienced regulators are not particularly effective in implementing complex systems of
bank rehabilitation and restructuring. While it is common for World Bank evaluations of
financial sectors in the FSU to conclude that one or more banks need fundamental restructuring,
our analysis suggests that the concept of a discrete once-for-all restructuring of any bank may be
misplaLced.  This concept  suggests that the standard inventory of restructuring techniques,
including management changes, bank re-capitalization etc.,  can be brought to  bear on  a bank
and can improve its perfonnance in some reasonably predictable manner and in a short period of
time. But this ignores two critical features of the real transition. First, the reality, as we have tried
to expLain  it, is that transition banks are exposed to a variety of ever-changing internal and
external forces which place them in a situation approaching continuous restructuring.  The idea
that this process can somehow be collapsed into a shorter period ignores the fact that no discrete
restructuring program -- however well designed -- can change the fundamental  nature of the
client base of the bank; the prevailing cultural mores within the bank; the incentive system which
motivates established (and probably replacement) managers and shareholders. Second, the idea
of a discrete restructuring program ignores the reality that real people (bank supervisors
supported by politicians) are needed to make many difficult and probably dangerous (to them)
decisions to actually implement the program. But in the context of a low skill base,
inexperienced staff and, above all, a limited consensus of public and political support for
enforcement measures, this delivery capacity is likely to be weak or non-existent even if skilled
advisory teams from abroad are recruited to help. So the message for the World Bank is that it
should be appropriately cautious about any  "bank restructuring" products which it may try to
offer clients - their effectiveness in reality is likely to be very limited. 38  3
51.  The experience of major banking crisis in Mexico in late- 1994 and the more recent
crises in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea in  1997, indicate that the World Bank is likely to
have a major ongoing role in helping to head off and deal with banking crises in client countries.
The analysis of this paper provides useful insights about the circumstances which may cause
crisis 1:o emerge in transition economies. Two can be cited by way of example. First, the
assessment of bank safety as summarized in Figures 1 to 3 makes it very clear that the position of
the risk frontier is one critical element in determining whether a banking system is "safe" or
"unsafe". Further, the main factors which can cause significant between period movements in the
frontier (as opposed to long term gradual movements) are the macroeconomic factors as listed in
paragraph 19 above). Hence our analysis is firmly rooted in the proposition that the trigger for a
banking crisis is just as likely to come from such factors, and especially macroeconomic causes,
than firom  problems in one or more specific bank. This is particularly important in the light of our
3  This  echoes  the conclusion  from the Pohl , Anderson,  and Djankov  paper cited earlier.  The authors  contend  that
bank re-capitalization  can best wait  both because  the true extent  of the bad loans  of a bank are difficult  to determine
while enterprise  restructuring  is still  ongoing,  and because  additional  capital  in a restructured  bank may well result
in additional  bad loans since  all lending  decisions  will continue  to be made in an unpredictable  and volatile
environment.
3  Even  in the more celebrated  of the Bank's involvement  with  bank restructuring,  this caution  has been shown  to
be justified.  See for example, F. Montes-Negret and L. Papi, The Polish Experience with Bank and Enterprise
Restructuring,  Policy,  Policy  Research  Working  Paper 1705,  January 1997.  This  notes  that re-capitalization  in
Polish  banks  worked  quite well  because  it was undertaken  when other  pre-requisites  to sustain  responsible  bank
behavior,  including  a modem  bank supervision  function,  were in place (p.23).
24earlier reservations about the potency of bank-specific interventions. It suggests that the World
Bank, in tooling up to address possible banking crises in the transition economies has to ensure
that it is well equipped with analysis and people to understand the macroeconomic influences on
bank performance, and not just the behavior of banks. 40
52.  Second, the paper has hypothesized that  a variety of factors in transition can encourage
some banks to push for expansion and new products before they have the skills to manage these
safely. This tendency too is partly dependent on decisions/policies made outside banks. For
example, in Krugmann's explanation of the East Asian banking crises in terms of Panglossian
modes of financial behavior, it is the presence of implicit government guarantees of banks which
creates the conditions for banks to over extend themselves. Such developments ought to be
perfectly capable of early detection, monitoring and correction in countries where we have an
active involvement and good working relations with bank regulators. It could be an important
World Bank role to help develop such monitoring capabilities in our clients.
53.  A further conclusion which emerges clearly from our analysis is that credit lines are
definitely a double-edged sword in terms of their ability to strengthen a banking system and
improve its safety. One thing we know for sure is that World Bank, EBRD,  or any other credit
line definitely enables the participating banks to get bigger and to  move into more difficult and
more risky products (i.e. to move along the horizontal axis of Figure 2). We have some examples
of FSU banks with no experience of loans with more than a maximum maturity of 6-9 months,
moving almost directly into investment credits denominated in a foreign currency and with
maturities of 4-6 years. This definitely requires these banks to assume greater risks. In some
cases, too, the scale of the credit line available is very large in relation to the capital of the banks.
Less clear but certainly true in some cases, is that the achievement of eligibility for World Bank
credit lines acts as an implicit  public ratification of a bank's  quality and results in its ability to
attract deposits and other resources which would otherwise be less readily available. These
resources also create the possibility for the banks concerned to grow larger and probably to
move into new and riskier areas of activity.
54.  To the extent that the implementation of the credit line also involves a serious and in-
depth institutional strengthening program in the banks which achieve eligibility, their increased
access to loanable resources can be a wholly positive development. In these cases the horizontal
movements in Figure 2 are matched by appropriate moves along the vertical axis to improved
levels of information processing which keep the risks to banks within reasonable bounds.  But it
is very clear from our analysis that credit lines which fail, or are overly casual,  in this dimension
of institutional development will do more harm than good to the banking system because they
will encourage premature moves of banks into riskier products. Again this finding suggests  a
potential source of a comparative advantage for the World Bank. Other agencies such as EBRD,
40  The Mishkin  paper cited earlier  is particularly  useful  in showing  what factors  to look  for and which  solutions
may  work. Especially  important  is his observation  that the standard  Western  approach  to dealing  with banking
problems  namely  monetary  expansion,  is unlikely  to work  in developing  (and  pari passu in transition)  economies.
This  is because  monetary  expansion  in  these countries  is likely  to result in exchange  rate depreciation  and numerous
negative  follow-on  consequences  for  banks including  higher interest  rates, deteriorated  balance  sheets  of borrowers,
and reduced  net worth  for banks themselves  to the extent  that  they too have borrowed  in foreign  currencies.  Instead,
quick  recovery  is likely  to require  the injection  of funds  fromforeign  sources  (as was the case in both  the Mexican
and the Thai crises).  Such injections  avoid  the negative  consequences  for banks  of a domestic  monetary  expansion.
25the Eurasia foundation etc. are under pressure to move money fast and are less likely to be
judged on the developmental impact of their activities. The World Bank, by contrast, can and
should devote time to ensure that the necessary improvements in the credit and other
management capacities of qualifying banks are achieved before they are allowed to channel
significant volumes of credit. Possible criticisms from our client countries about our long
processing times ought to be readily countered in terms of the need to match new product
development in banks with the skills and capacities to deliver these safely.
55.  A related point deriving from the analysis of the paper is that capital adequacy is an
extremely poor basis for screening banks for eligibility for our credit lines. All of the doubts
about the practical usefulness of this concept as developed in Annex 1 to this paper, contribute to
this conclusion. But in addition, it is evident that World Bank and other credit lines are often
large enough to significantly change the size as well as the nature of the risks to which
participating banks are exposed. The practice of allowing banks access to credit lines on the basis
of capital adequacy levels far below the Basle recommended minimum of 8 percent is also
difficult to justify - unless additional measures are also taken in these cases to mitigate the
additional risks. There are also serious problems in the early stages of transition in assigning to
bank supervision departments the full responsibility for monitoring ongoing bank compliance
with eligibility conditions. These problems relate directly to the incentive and skill/capacity
problems analyzed in some depth in Section V of this paper. The implication here is that we need
to re-open the discussion about the appropriate conditions which need to be met before banks are
given access to World Bank credit lines. The conditions need to be calibrated much more around
the real and changing risks encountered by transition banks.
56.  On a more constructive note, the paper has suggested that there are specific but less
convenitional  approaches whereby transition banks can be regulated and kept reasonably safe.
These approaches map directly to our analytical framework and involve an ongoing compatibility
test between the products being offered by each bank and its information processing and other
management capabilities. We would  argue (see also Annex 1) that this is a less skill-intensive
approach to regulation and supervision and one which can provide benefits even in advance of
the long gestating institutional reforms (e.g IAS accounting) which underpin Western systems of
bank supervision and regulation. These approaches would seem to justify more attention and
analysis from World Bank specialists as possible early stage complements to our more
conventional  forms of advice.
57.  The last conclusion is that we need to be guarded in our own innovations. It is easy
enough to find gaps in the financial product ranges available in most FSU and other transition
economies - housing finance, pensions, primary and secondary markets for corporate securities,
special loan facilities for small businesses and farmers etc. As we come up with World Bank
products to help close some of these gaps it is a natural tendency to search for existing financial
institutions that can be the sponsor for one or more of the necessary new products. But as our
analysis makes clear, the risk characteristics of any new product needs to be assessed very
carefully against the informational processing capacities of the institutions which are asked to
play a role. To the extent that those capacities are inadequate for reasonably safe delivery of the
new product, it is incumbent upon us to devote the resources needed to build the capacity -
preferably before the new products are put into service.
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AnnexesANNEX 1'
IMPLICATIONS  FOR BANK SUPERVISION
1.  This Annex considers the usefulness of conventional regulatory and
supervisory approaches in dealing with the turmoil and uncertainty confronting banks
in the transition economies. In particular it asks (a) whether these approaches are
conceptually appropriate for the special circumstances of the transition and, equally
important, (b) whether the gestation time needed to implement such approaches is
sufficiently short to give them any real influence on the situation, at least in the early
years of the transition. If the answer to either of this questions is in the negative, we
need to re-examine the conceptual foundations of bank regulation and supervision to
define some alternative approaches to foster the safety of transition banking systems.
A. Capital Adequacy
2.  The incomplete knowledge which make banking risky cannot be eliminated
fully even in the most sophisticated system. Indeed, as we have seen, sophistication
may increase risk in some cases. The traditional asymmetric information literature
suggests however,  that well-functioning banks are better at limiting the risks than
other types of intermediary. This insight fits uncomfortably with the accepted view of
bank regulators that risks in banks should be controlled by imposing a risk-weighted
capital adequacy ratios (e.g., at least eight percent as in the Basle Committee
recommendations). The capital  requirement and the associated guidelines flow from
an analytical approach which is essentially probabilistic in nature (e.g., in repeated
observations of banks with an "acceptable" risk profile, no more than $1.00 of every
$12.50 of loans will be lost, implying that a capital cushion of eight percent gives
reasonable security). Moreover, they take  almost no account of the practical realities
of transition as discussed in the body of the paper. Above all, the probability
measures which underlie traditional capital guidelines are assumed to be reasonably
stable, both across time and in different economies.
3  By contrast, the "uncertainty" reflected in our proposed analytical framework
is not readily reduced to a probabilistic calculus -- "risk" is the wrong term -- and
certainly not to one which  manifests stability across time and space. As Figures 1
and 2 in the body of the paper illustrate, banks in a transition economy need to deal
with turbulence in their operating environment as well as evolving changes in their
own information processing capabilities. These can cause major changes across the
transition, and at any point within it,  in the cushion of capital that banks require to be
"safe."  Hence the pragmatic suggestion that banks in transition economies should
hold substantially more capital relative to assets than banks elsewhere, is
IThe authors are indebted to Silke Reinig for intensive and effective research assistance with both
Annexes.
2understandable. However, it needs to be far better founded in some analytical
framework which can tell us how much more is enough, before it is really useful. 2
4  This is not to reject entirely the case for capital adequacy rules. 3 The  question
is whether and to what extent capital adequacy can serve as the central risk control
device for banks in transition, as it does for banks in other circumstances. The early
indications are that capital adequacy regulations provide an uncertain and
unpredictable protection, at best, for transition banks.  The intensive application of the
Basle principles is unlikely to mitigate the dangers to banks and depositors
highlighted by our earlier discussion.  Capital, above all, is not an effective substitute
for the information-processing capabilities of banks as reflected in our Figures.
5.  The Conceptual Basis of Capital Adequacy.  At first glance, the Basle risk
weightings summarized in Box Al  do map closely to the risk exposures of banks
which are suggested by the analysis based on asymmetric information as represented
in Figures 1 and 2. In the very early stages of transition, most bank assets will be
"safe" assets with low risk-weight, including large cash holdings, balances with the
central bank (including probably large required reserves) and, most important, loans
to state-owned enterprises which are still highly integrated into the budgetary system.
Hence, the banking system  (but not necessarily the fiscal probity of the economy) is
quite safe and the amount of financial capital needed in banks to defend that safety
can be argued to be quite low. Gradually, as more state-owned enterprises are
privatized, as the state withdraws financial support from other enterprises (voluntarily
or involuntarily) and as formal reserve requirements are lowered, a greater part of
total bank assets will fall into the higher risk classes and the amount of  financial
capital required for safety will rise. In other words, both the risk frontier in Figures 1
and 2 and the capital required for "safe" operation rise as the transition proceeds.
2 For example. A Steinherr and D. Gros, Chapter  9 of  Winds of Change: Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe,
Longman,  1995.
'The  arguments in favor are well rehearsed.  The more capital a bank has, the more able it will be to overcome extemal  shocks and to
absorb  losses.  Adequate  capital can also exert a crucial influence on the internal incentives for prudent behavior  by banks and their
efficient governance.  A high capital  level increases shareholder's  incentives to control the bank management  and to limit the risks  of
investments.By  contrast,  banks with  low or negative  capital are more likely to take  on highly  risky investment.  Their  owners  have
nothing to lose. For example, with the recommended Basle minimum of 8 percent capital  adequacy, 8 units of capital  can be leveraged
to produce 100 units of bank assets if all the assets in question are in the 100% risk-weight class as in  Annex Table Al  However,  the
same 8 units of capital can be leveraged up to produce 500 units of bank assets if all the assets in question are in the 20% risk-weight
class, and an almost infinitely  large bank if all its assets are classified as riskless.
3Box IA: Risk Weights for On-balance Sheet Assets
Weight (%)  Asset Category
(%  *Cash
* Balances  at and claims  on domestic  central  bank
. Loans  to domestic  central  Government
* Securities  issued  by domestic  central  Government
. Assets  totally  collateralised  by cash  or domestic  central  Government  securities
or fully guaranteed  by domestic  central  Government
20%  * Claims  on domestic  and foreign  banks  with  an original  maturity  of under one
year
* Claims  on domestic  banks  with an original  maturity  of one year or and over and
loans  guaranteed  by domestic  banks
. Claims  on foreign  central  governments  in local  currency  financed  by loca'
currency  liabilities
* Cash items  in the process  of collection
50%  * Loans  to owner-occupiers  for residential  house  purchase  fully  secured  by
mortgage
100%  . Claims  on the private  sector
. Cross-border  claims  on foreign  banks  with an original  maturity  of more than
one year
. Claims  on foreign  central  Governments
. Claims  on commercial  companies  owned  by the public  sector
* Premises,  plant, equipment  and other fixed  assets
* Real estate and other  investments  (including  non-consolidated  investment  in
other  companies)
* Capital  instruments  issued  by other  banks
. all other assets
6.  However,  closer  inspection  suggests  that in practice  the mapping  from the
actual uncertainties faced by banks in transition to Basle capital requirements is
extremely imprecise. There are numerous problems with the Basle Committee
recommendations when applied to a typical transition economy.  For example, there
is always an ambiguity  over which bank loans to state-owned enterprises can really
be categorized as having government guarantees (risk class = 0%) and which are
loans to "commercial companies owned by the public sector" (risk class = 100%).
And, even assuming an accurate initial classification, in the transition, a loan can
mnigrate  from one category to another quickly and unpredictably, as a result of
political and economic developments.  Should banks be allowed the infinite leverage
of their own capital which the zero percent risk-weight suggests or merely the 12.5
4times leverage suggested by the 100% risk weight? 4 In any event, does even a 12.5
times leverage really do much to protect depositors in those transition economies
populated by extremely sick state-owned enterprises? In addition, for most transition
economies, it would be a fundamental error to classify bank loans to other banks in
the moderate (20%) risk class although some set of inter-bank loans might sensibly be
classified in this way. 5 The classification of all loans to the private sector as equally
risky is also suspect in light of the uncertain environment for private business, as
well, for example, as the fundamental differences between private start-ups and
privatized enterprises. In general, even if one were able to fully and precisely
implement the Basle recommendations for most transition economies, one would
have little confidence that banks which met the recommended minimum were
particularly "safe." And yet this is precisely what is done in almost all Bank-
supported credit lines where a Basle-type level of capital adequacy is the first of the
eligibility criteria which participating banks need to meet.
7.  Practical Problems with Balance Sheet-based Regulation.  The problems
of applying Basle guidelines to the transition economy banking sectors  involve far
more than the "correct"  size of the capital adequacy ratio or the correct risk
weightings. On the assets side of the ratio, the valuation of bank assets is subject to a
series of intractable difficulties, including the highly unpredictable fortunes of
enterprises, excessively volatile taxation regimes characterized by the retroactive
application of changes, shallow asset markets and unclear property rights, as well as
the ongoing privatization programs.  State-owned enterprise profitability is largely
dependent on unpredictable political decisions, including the allocation of subsidies
and the decision of whether, how and when to privatize.'  And political as well as
financial disincentives to recognizing loan losses provides a powerful inducement to
avoid the proper characterization of bad and questionable loans.
8.  Irreducible uncertainty applicable to the capital component of this key ratio is
no less troublesome.  Large loans to insiders, (at times used to finance the purchase of
shares as, for example, in the Russian FIGs), combined with inappropriate accounting
procedures, leading to unjustified dividend payments, raise serious additional
questions about the utility of capital as a cushion for loan losses. Even where capital
is properly accounted for, excessive insider loans and violations of the large exposure
'  Steinherr and Gros  suggest amending the measurement of capital and of risk-weighted assets to raise the risk weight for long-term
claims on banks (from 20% to  100%), for claims on the domestic central government (from 0% to 20%) and for long-term claims  on
the corporate sector (from 100% to 150%)
5  Banks in both Russia and Ukraine learnt from mini banking crises in 1995 that inter-bank lending in an environment of poor quality
information was extremely risky. Hence in both countries there were major losses in the inter-bank market and a subsequent significant
decline in its size and importance.
6 It should  be noted, in this regard, that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's  1996 Transition  Report estimates
that more than 50% of the medium- and large-scale enterprises in the FSU have not  yet been privatized.  And this figure  does not
reflect the substantial residual  interests retained by governments in many "privatized" enterprises, an interest which raises the specter
of continued  political  interference  in  these enterprises'  operational  decisions,  and thus  their  profitability.  See  generally  EBRD,
Transition Report 1996 -- Infrastructure and Savings (1996),  page 11.
5limnits,  raise the question of whether any capital asset ratio short of 100% (or possibly
even more) could provide a prudent level of protection for depositors.
9.  There are at least three further elements underlying this implied criticism of
the Basle approach. First, the 1988 Basle Accord only recognizes credit risk, which is
easier to assess probabilistically. 7 However, the huge tLurbulence  experienced in the
past six to eight years in most transition economies, is much more a function of
market risk and other risk components (falling real output, unstable exchange rates,
high variability of key certain input prices; major changes in access to major markets
etc.). As our framework indicates, any of these shifts can easily cause a shift in the
location of the Risk Frontier, with its consequent redefinition of an erstwhile "safe"
bank into a substantially "unsafe" one or vice-versa. This has led some commentators
to question not only the adequacy of the eight percent target for capital adequacy 8 but
also the concept itself. 9
10.  Second, even the assessment of the magnitudes of credit risk in the Basle
recommendations, and the risk weights derived from these, relate to the statistical
probability of loss. They fail to factor in the competence and motivation of the
managers and shareholders of banks. Hence a 12.5: 1 leverage of capital may
establish a reasonable  statistical probability of the safety of depositors funds in well-
established banks which enjoy competent, honest and well-trained management. It has
little scientific prospect of defending the interests of depositors in an incompetently
managed, and possibly dishonest start-up bank where the motivations of both
shareholders and managers are also questionable - and most of the time we know little
or nothing about the competence or honesty of our client country bankers.
1J.  Third, and most important, the evidence available suggests that early and
mid-stage transition economies especially in the FSU are unlikely to be able to
measure capital or assets adequately and enforce anything like the type of control
enivisaged  in Basle. This has several aspects.
*  The Basle concepts are generally poorly understood both in terms of the
principles underlying the requirements/language; the measurement and
calculation methods; and the  accounting and IT system needed in banks to
apply them properly.
The 1996 amendment to the accord began to correct this.
8  For example.  A Steinherr  and D. Gros in Chapter  9 of  Winds of  Change: Economic  Transition  in Central and Eastern  Europe,
Longman,  1995.  These authors criticize  the application BIS capital  adequacy standards  in transition  economies  for ignoring  the
importance of risk diversification; for not placing enough weight on the maturity of claims; for underestimating the riskiness of claims
on other financial institutions;  and fordiscriminating  against privatization by ascribing low risk to loans to the govemment  and
creating incentives for increased lending to the government .They suggest amending the measurement of capital  and of risk-weighted
acsets to raise the risk weight for long-term claims on banks (from 20% to 100%), for claims on the domestic central govemment (form
0'Yo  to 20%)  and for long-term claims on the corporate sector (from 100% to 150%)
9 Most recently Gerard Caprio in a Comment in S.K. Bery and V.F Garcia (editors), Preventing Banking Sector Distress and Crises in
Ltwlin  America, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 360.
6*  Rules on disclosure of non-performing loans are typically very slow to
appear in the transition economies and take even longer to be enforced
fully. Even when this occurs, financial information on firms is typically
insufficient to achieve a reliable classification of loans.
*  Even if some banks do achieve the internal accounting and other systems
necessary to implement the required measurement and classification, the
competence of supervisory bodies to check compliance is also very slow to
develop in many transition economies.
12.  We can illustrate these difficulties with the Basle concept by reference to the
issue of IAS accounting. It would be generally agreed that the introduction of full IAS
is a  necessary  (but not sufficient) condition for the successful application and
enforcement of Basle principals. But some eight years after the transition process
started, only a handful of FSU countries (the Baltics and Kazakhstan in particular)
have achieved new accounting systems based on IAS, and enforced through regular
IAS audits in most banks. In most FSU countries including the largest countries --
Russia and Ukraine -- progress in this direction is confined to a limited minority of
banks with generally weak enforcement through banking supervision.
13.  The conclusion from this analysis is that  we should certainly not  reject the
idea that some variant of a capital adequacy rule can be a useful ultimate target for
regulatory policy in transition economics. However, the extensive work of the Basle
Committee in defining the riskiness of different types of bank products does not seem
particularly  robust for the very special circumstances of transition economies. Many
of the peculiar circumstances and incentives which we have analyzed earlier, are
captured only poorly if at all by the capital adequacy conventions. Hence, it may be
unrealistic to expect that this regulatory tool can be of much assistance in reality
during the first part of the transition (perhaps ten years or more) in most transition
economies. During that period we need to advocate strongly the adequate
capitalization of banks but also to look to other, and probably less conventional,
approaches to analyze and defend the stability of the financial system.
B.  The Regulation and Supervision of Banks
14.  A comprehensive  system of banking regulation and supervision is a
cornerstone supporting a sound banking system and the development of such a system
is an integral part of the public policy reforms that the Bank needs to support.
Whether banks are well or badly motivated, internally efficient or inefficient, an
official regulatory oversight of them provides a second level of defense to protect the
interests of depositors and limit the dangers of systemic damage.  This is especially
true when any form of bank restructuring is also advocated as an element of reforms.
Unless controls can be put into place to limit the impact of moral hazard, adverse
7selection and political influences on lending and other operational decisions by
restructured banks, potential gains will be lost in another flood of bad loans.
15.  But again the timing of this part of reform is the real issue and one which is
rarely faced up to. In practice, improved bank supervision is normally given high
priority as an early stage reform. However, our earlier comments have already
questioned whether improvements in this area can realistically be expected during the
early years of transition. In reality, many years are likely to be needed to overcome all
the impediments in skills, culture etc. referred to in the main paper .Experience so far
suggests that, for most countries, it is  not realistic to expect the creation of really
effective regulatory and supervisory monitoring of banks as an  early stage reform. As
a recent IMF report for the regular Basle Committee meetings notes, in 11 of the 15
FSU countries, moderate or substantial progress has been made in improving the
quality of banking supervision.  But the IMF paper also notes that these gains will all
remain at risk if improvements are not realized in data quality, accounting, loan
quality assessment skills, financial analysis and inspection techniques, as well as in
the qualitative assessments of bank governance, management and staff.
16.  The World Bank's own experience with individual banks, as well as with their
customers, underlines these conclusions and concerns. Across the FSU, fundamental
deficiencies in the basic business environment, and the behavioral patterns of banks,
raise the question of whether, in the early stages of the transition, the traditional
approach to banking regulation may have to be adjusted, at least temporarily, to
accommodate to the reality of the situation.  Several observations, common to the
FSU experience, lead to this conclusion. They include:
17.  The Legal Infrastructure.  While great progress has been made in the
introduction of modern legislation directly regulating central bank and commercial
bank activities in the FSU, many problems remain with the actual enforcement of the
new rules of the game. In addition, in most FSU countries,  improvements are needed
in the legal environment which has an indirect impact on banks.  The collateral and
bankruptcy laws, in particular, are virtually unusable in most FSU countries, either
because they have not yet been adjusted to support market economies, or, more
seriously, because the institutions needed to implement these laws - attorneys,
judges, courts, operational manuals and procedures, registries and the like, are
deficient, if not absent entirely.  The creation of  an enforceable legal infrastructure
for lending raises the Risk Frontier significantly, which makes bank activities less
risky and sets the foundation for banks moving into more sophisticated and riskier
activities.
18.  This web of deficiencies in the legal infrastructure creates a situation where
collateral remains a poor risk management device - although the Bank routinely
prornotes its greater use in lending decisions and loan valuations.'°  Typically, to be
'0 For example in the loan loss provisioning  regulations which the Bank frequently helps to draft.
8useful, collateral must be brought under the physical control of the lending bank with
its realization remaining a matter  sanctioned by law. Often, the enforcement of loan
contracts is entrusted to private forces -- again  a questionable legal state of affairs --
or bank lending is limited to previously well-known customers who may be linked to
the bank.  This latter approach can be seen as an effort by individual banks to reduce
the risks inherent in their business - replacing the missing infrastructure with self-
help. "Good" bank supervision should try to put an end to such practices, but in the
FSU this may undermine the few risk mitigating devices available to early stage
transition banks.
19.  Universal Banking  and Cross-Ownership Concerns.  Most, if not all, of the
FSU countries have a defacto  universal banking system in place, under which banks
are free to move a considerable distance along the dimension of sophistication in their
product mix. However, because there has been no organized debate and positive
legislative action to embrace this banking structure, the means to regulate non-core
banking business, and to integrate the risk management systems of different types of
activity, is lacking, which places these banks firmly in the High Risk realm. The
discussion about consolidated supervision is only now beginning  These situations
present substantial challenges in the consolidation, assessment and supervision of
risks undertaken by banks. In most, if not all FSU countries, there is not even the
beginning of an effort to deal with these complex matters.  In these and other cases,
one must ask whether we are asking too much of inexperienced, under-resourced
regulators.
20.  Human  Capital.  The foundation of skills needed for  a modem bank
regulatory system is another source of concern in the FSU.  The systems being put in
place in the FSU countries rely heavily on the ability of key individuals to produce,
report and analyze financial data in ways that are largely alien to the historical
experience of these very individuals.  Some progress has been made, and the efforts
of both the World Bank and the IMF are heavily invested in making up this skills gap.
But there is a general consensus that only the tip of the skills-gap iceberg has been
addressed. Not only are average skills levels low, but, in such an environment, there is
a serious "brain drain" problem, in which the most technically adept individuals tend
to migrate to the private sector, with its higher salaries.  This phenomenon alone
raises a particularly troublesome concern in a low-skill environment, where those
interested in avoiding or evading the law are likely to remain significantly more adept
than those charged with enforcing it. This issue is exacerbated by the relatively low
status of the supervisory function in most FSU central banks, as well as the lack of
budgetary and regulatory autonomy of these functions. Again it raises doubt that
regulation and supervision can really be seen as an early stage foundation on which
we can build other reforms.
21.  Corruption.  The potentially debilitating effects of corruption are at least as
significant in the banking sector as in other areas of the economy -possibly more so,
in light of the freer availability of wealth in more liquid, accessible form and the
9capital leveraging potential which a banking license bestows on shareholders.
Certainly, the FSU faces particularly severe issues of systemic corruption because of
its history, the stresses of the transition, the opportunities presented by structural
refomis such as privatization, and by political and economic volatility.  Where
controls and institutions are weak, the greater the discretion left in the hands of
government officials, the greater are the opportunities for corruption. Unfortunately,
Western-style systems of banking supervision incorporate many points at which
supervisory officials are required to exercise substantial discretion. Experience in the
FSU seems to indicate that supervisors have few inhibitions about imposing and
enforcing the more modest of the  sanctions legally available to them. However, they
have demonstrated very considerable reluctance to deal with major abuses and, in
particular, to address seriously the problems in larger and politically well connected
banks at least until the abuses become so high profile that they are impossible to
ignore. Corruption may not be to blame in all such cases but it certainly colors
technical judgements in many of them.
C. An Alternative Regulatory System for Transition Banks
22.  Under the difficult circumstances outlined above, it may be worthwhile to
revisit the philosophical basis of banking regulation in the FSU and consider
supplementing the current systems with a simpler, more proscriptive approach closely
tailored to the special problems of the FSU countries.  This could involve, at least at
the outset, a system which places fewer analytical demands on the regulators (e.g.,
less need to measure "capital" precisely or to classify loans accurately), combined
with higher transparency of information and public disclosure of bank financial
information."'  It could, in particular, take particular note of the conception
represented in the main paper that banking "safety" is all about the tension between
the information processing capabilities of banks on the one hand, and the information
ideall y needed to monitor and manage the risks of particular products on the other.
Thus, for banks which have not yet proved themselves to be capable of gathering,
analyzing and presenting credible information about their financial position and loan
portfolio to a reasonable standard,' 2 permissible activities could be severely limited to
those easily monitored by the regulators and presenting acceptably low risk,
especially to depositors. Such an approach would compel these less sophisticated
banks to remain in the Low Risk area, by virtue of their product mix.
23.  Under such a system, for example, deposit-taking could be restricted to just a
few banks which are demonstrably of good quality or which are capable of tight
supervision. Contrast that with the approach prevalent in World Bank and EBRD
credit lines which gives a few banks early access to funds for (higher risk) medium
and longer term investment lending on the basis of the satisfaction of certain often
" In this connection, the feasibility of establishing privately-owned, domestic bank rating agencies should be explored in parallel with
any official reporting of banks that may be required.
12  In the case of the presentation of information this could be the familiar Intemational Accounting Standards.
10complex conditions -- conditions which are difficult to supervise adequately without
incurring high additional costs.3 Where the system as a whole provides no safe
alternative for household savings, it may be worthwhile to define an extremely
limited form of permitted deposit-taking, incorporating 100% reserve requirements,
invested in safe assets, for savings banks. A second example would be the denial of
licenses for foreign exchange operations to any bank which could not demonstrate
some minimal ability to deal with the additional risks involved. And no bank should
be allowed to do any transactions in derivative securities without clearly
demonstrating its abilities to engage in the information processing necessary to do so.
Another example might be the prohibition of any deposit-taking on the basis of
interest rate offers which were clearly unsustainable relative to prevailing rates of
return on the country's economic activities.
24.  Similarly, as bank skills are demonstrated to increase, increasingly less rigid
controls could be applied and banks could be permitted a wider range of business
transactions.  Only when it is clear that a given bank possesses analytical skills,
information processing capabilities and other characteristics commensurate with the
products it seeks to offer (or perhaps comparable to its counterparts in developed
market economies), should the regulatory regime of those economies be fully applied
to such a bank.  This would not only control risk at the individual bank level, but it
would buy time for the regulators themselves to learn their trade better.
25.  One merit of this approach is that it matches the "curiosities" of the incentives
and behavior of transitional banking systems to the design of a transition-specific
system of regulation.  And significantly, just like Moliere's Bourgeois Gentilhomme
who had spoken prose all his life without realizing it, several of the FSU countries
have already invented the elements of this transitional regulatory system for banks.
Some such as Russia and Ukraine have managed to concentrate household deposit
taking in a limited number of banks which are then either restricted in their risk-
taking behavior, or subject to intensified supervision. Others - again Ukraine is an
example - employ a graduated system of banking licenses with the breadth of the
license increasing as the capabilities of the bank concerned is shown to increase".
This provides a low cost way of limiting the risks generated in "doubtful" banks short
of their closure or liquidation- both of which are far more problematic interventions.
Russia, and (soon) Ukraine, have devised restrictions on bank resourcing though the
issue of promissory notes.
13 An example is the FIDP project in Russia which has addressed the inadequacy of the supervision capacities of the Central Bank of
Russia by establishing a specialized Bank Review Unit managed by foreign experts. This is a good approach but because of its costs is
not easily replicable across a large number of banks.
14 Specifically, the Ukrainian licensing system recognizes 37 separate activities and very few banks are licensed to conduct all of
these. Examples of the separately licensed activities include managing accounts and settlements of non-resident customers, receiving
loans from other banks, accepting deposits from households, dealing in foreign exchange on the local markets, dealing in foreign
exchange in offshore markets, conducting trust operations, opening bank branches inside Ukraine, opening branches offshore.
11ANNEX 2
SOME INITIAL QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
1.  In this Annex we attempt to  relate our proposed framework to  some of the
more  obvious  tendencies  which  we  have  observed  in  the  first  6-7  years  of  the
transition  on the FSU.  This  attempt  is built around  some  stylized facts about the
transition experience in two classes of FSU countries namely slow and fast reformers
as defined more fully below. For the moment the evidence is taken mainly from three
countries  - Russia, Ukraine, and Latvia - the first two  exemplifying  slow reform and
the lasi:  exemplifying  relative rapid financial reform.
2.  It is not possible to provide a unified representation of the transition that would
be  applicable to  the  financial systems of  all  FSU  countries.  However,  there  are
important standard features some of which can be verified empirically.  There are also
clear distinctions in the responses of different FSU countries to the externally imposed
components of the transition. For this purpose,  we draw on the  analytical insights
derived from  a  two  period  model of  saving and  the  associated  specification of  a
dynamic transition path proposed  by Patrick Conway.'5 This is presented  here in a
simplified  form in order to enable us better to  connect it with the foregoing analysis.
The Conway results about the broad macro and sectoral tendencies associated with
financiial  transition are summarized in Column One of  Table Al  at the end of this
Annex. Column Two of Table Al  sets out our initial conjectures about how banks in
the FSU might have been impacted by the main macro developments shown in the first
column.
3.  The conjectures set out in column two of Table Al  are all matters of direct
relevance to our analytical framework as summarized in Figures 1 and 2. However, at
this  sl.age , they do  not  add up  to  a complete  story about the transition. For this
purpose  much more institutional detail and  country  specificity would be  required.
However,  they do  permit  us to  assess  some  initial ideas  which  are  amenable to
empirncal  validation or, possibly rejection. We build up the story in stages.
The Size of the Financial Sector
4.  Most FSU countries suffered an immediate and major decline in the size of
their banking sectors after the break up of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s in
the manner indicated by Conway's analysis. (See column 2 of Table Al ).
5.  However, the extent and persistence of this decline differed greatly depending
on the policy regimes after that date. This is evidenced by the selected indicators for
three countries -Russia, Ukraine and Latvia - as shown in Figure Al below.
"  Patrick Conway, " Saving in Transition Econonmies  -Sunmnary  Report "  Working Paper financed by World Bank Research Grant 679-
07, March 1995.
12Figure Al:  Selected Economic Indicators - Cross Country Comparison
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136.  The  bottom  panel  of  Figure  Al  shows  the  decline  in  financial  sectors
associated with the general price liberalization and suggests that Russia suffered the
largest declines followed by Latvia and Ukraine. But this initial impact started to be
reversed almost immediately by the faster reforming Latvia. By contrast,  Ukraine -
initially the least badly affected of the three - saw on-going declines which reduced
that country's  banking sector to  the smallest of the three by 1994. The reasons are
mainly linked to  the inflation experience which in turn was directly affected by the
speedc  of correction of their respective budget deficits. (i.e. differences in the stage 3
behavior  as described in the  TableA2) Latvia's  budget  deficit never became large
relative to GDP and through the mid 1990s was confined to a few percentage points of
GDP.(  See panel 1 of Figure  Al).  By  contrast, the deficits in Russia and Ukraine
becarne huge after  1992 and remained large (as well probably as being understated)
through  most  subsequent years.  The extremely slow budget  adjustment in Ukraine
seems directly associated with the near hyper inflation experienced in 1993 and 1994 -
an inflation which is directly responsible for the  catastrophic further  decline in  the
financial sector through 1995.
7.  However,  our analytical framework enables us to  suggest that three  factors
probably mitigated the  dangers  of  systemic crisis in  the  slowest of  the  reforming
countries - Ukraine amongst these three comparator countries. First slow progress on
stabi!Lization  was  mirrored  in  slow  progress  on  privatization and  other  structural
reforms. Hence the pressures on banking system safety were diluted by the continued
insulation of "banks" under the wing of the state - the countries' banks remained near
the left and the bottom of the distribution of banks shown in Figure 3 in the main body
of the paper. Second, the very high inflation had the effect of eroding the accumulated
bad  loans of the banks and making these extremely small (as were total  bank loans)
relative to the countries' levels of GDP. It is true that bank capital was also eroded by
the same mechanism but this mattered less because of the tight integration of banking
activity and the state which we have already mentioned. Third, interest margins and
other sources of bank profitability were sustained by the ongoing distortions in the
economy and  the  ongoing volatility of  many key  prices including that  of  foreign
exchange.
Deposit Mobilization
8.  This divergence in the risk characteristics of the three FSU countries had an
obvious counterpart in their abilities to mobilize deposits. As Figure A2 indicates, in
Latvia real interest  rates on deposits never became significantly negative and some
rates were positive in real terms as early as  1993. By contrast,  neither Russia nor
Ukraine achieved positive real interest rates (based on measured inflation) until 1996.
Furthermore, the inflation experiences of these two countries suggest that real interest
rates  calculated  on  the  basis  of  peoples  expectations  about  inflation,  remain
significantly  negative even today. The demon of inflation is certainly not driven out of
these countries and the public are quite rationale in expecting that actual inflation will
sooner or later rise to much higher levels than today we observe.
14Figure  A2:  Development of Real and  Nominal Deposit Rates in Latvia,  Russia,
Ukraine  1990 - 1996 (per annum/in  %)
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159.  This set of developments in turn had a major impact on the levels of voluntary
(and especially household deposits) in the banks of the three  comparator countries.
See Figure A3. By 1993/1994, Latvian banks had already re-built household deposits
to amounts equal to  10-12 percent of GDP. The corresponding percentages in Russia
and  IJkraine were  only  1-2  percent  of  GDP.  Again  this  difference confirms the
enormous divergence in the riskiness of the different banking sectors only 2-3 years
after itheir  transitions began.  16 In Russia but especially in Ukraine, there was at most a
trivial systemic risk associated with the banks' exposure to household deposits. This
risk  was  even  more  diluted  by  the  continued  concentration  of  the  majority  of
household deposits in the Sberbanks of the two  countries both of which offered full
deposit insurance. It did not matter much that the banks of those two  countries were
relatively poorly managed and subject to only embryonic regulation.
10.  By  contrast,  in  Latvia,  the  emerging,  and  still inexperienced  and  poorly
regulated private banks rapidly acquired resources from private depositors equivalent
to over 10 percent of GDP at a time when systemic risk was also high because of the
transition  factors  outside  the  control  of  bank  managements  (i.e.  the  factors
conditioning the position of the risk frontier in Figure 2 of the text). It is easy to see in
terms, of our conceptual framework why Latvia was more exposed to banking crisis
than the other two countries. 17 Specifically, in the case of Latvia the growth of real
credii: in the years  1993 and  1994 was highly positive whereas in both Russia and
Ukraine the corresponding rates of growth were highly negative. The ratio of credit
outstanding to GDP rose in Latvia from 11.7% in 1992 to 22.6% by 1994. In Russia
that same ratio fell by about a third and in Ukraine during the same two year period it
fell by over 60%. Latvian banks needed rapidly to  find new customers or to  greatly
increase their exposures to  existing customers - a pressure which is well known to
have caused banking portfolio  difficulties in other countries. Early access to  Forex
denominated resources from abroad exacerbated the pressures to early expansion."
3. Emerging  Innovations  in Banks.
11.  The conjecture about bank behavior which we have derived from the Conway
model (see column 2 of the Table A2) suggest that the banks losing deposit resources
as  financial depth  generally declines,  might face  pressures  to  move  into  riskier
activities in an attempt to  restore their positions.  Additionally, there  are numerous
other pressures which might encourage a shift to riskier banking in the early stages of
transition. These are discussed in the text  and include privatization and the possible
16
Fleming, Chu and Bakker observe  that one factor which pushed  banks in Latvia into ill-advised  lending was the ease of availability of
foreign credit lines. We would suggest  that this was not a fundamental cause  but rather was derivative  from Latvia's early progress  on
reform which increased confidence in banks before the informnation  processing  skills of the bankers were such as to justify this confidence.
Alex Fleming,  Lily Chu, and Marie-Renee  Bakker, The Baltics -Banking  Crises Observed, Policy Research Paper, 1647. World Bank,
September 1996.
17 It is more difficult  to be categorical about specific  sources ofthose dangers. In the case of interest rates, real deposit rates were either
positive or slightly negative after 1994 but lending rates on average were substantially positive in real terms. This means that any borrowers
whose output prices were rising at rates below general inflation faced high real rates - a possible source of adverse risk problems for the
Latvian banks.
'8  Fleming, Chu, and Bakker, op. cit.
16loss  of  established clients,  increased  stability in  interest  rates  and  exchange  rates
reducing  the  scope  for  speculative profits,  and  above  all  the  weakening  of  the
relationships with  the  body politic.  The  evidence from  the two  slower adjusting
countries (Russia and Ukraine) suggests that the banks, in spite of lower volumes of
business after  1992, nonetheless enjoyed high margins and  achieved high rates  of
profitability on the basis of the continued distortions in the system. These distortions
arose  in turn  both  from the  slow progress  in reducing inflation (including volatile
foreign exchange rates and the ongoing shortages of foreign exchange), and from the
slow pace  of  some structural  reforms.  The major banks  in Ukraine,  for  example,
continued through  1995, to attract very cheap rediscounts from the Central Bank for
on-lending to those activities targeted for direct credits. However in spite of this, the
greatly reduced volumes of banking business also stimulated certain innovations in
banking activity most of which were relatively high risk,
12.  As  a  first  example of  this,  banks  found  that  they  could  overcome  the
unwillingness of  the  public to  hold  local  currency  deposits  by  instead  mobilizing
deposits in foreign currencies. The scope for doing this was limited - capital flight was
a more complete hedge for private savings against the risks endemic in these countries
in the early tentative  stages of reform - but nonetheless Forex borrowing did offer
banks a  way to  gain resources  for  on-lending. In  Ukraine, for  example, by  1994
foreign currency deposits were the equivalent of 8.5 percent of GDP. Because of the
large excess demand, the margins on these resources were  very high and were  the
source  of  substantial  profits  for  the  banks.  The  position  in  each  of  the  three
comparator countries in this regard is summarised in Figure A3 below.
13.  The foreign currency activities of the banks  was probably not  a  significant
source of excessive risk at that time. It was relatively easy, given the excess demand,
for Forex resources for banks to match their asset and liability exposures. For the same
reason, the credit risks on their lending were limited by the banks'  abilities to  cherry-
pick their borrowers. The risks to banks were also diluted by the status of many of
them as still-integrated with the state system. But even if this had not been true the
size  of  the  total  resources  banks  had  to  on-lend  (even  allowing for  their  Forex
borrowings) remained quite a lot smaller than was the case in the faster reforming
economies exemplified  by Latvia.
14.  A second innovation which also increased bank risks was the increased resort
to inter-bank borrowings. Such borrowings were used extensively during 1993-96 in
banks  in  the  slower  reforming  economies  to  escape  from  their  tight  resource
constraints.  This  was  a  financial innovation which  was  not  well based  on  the
information processing skills of the banks. The banks which acted as the main sources
of  the  funds,  in  many  cases,  were  particularly  ill-equipped  to  assess  the
creditworthiness of the banks to  whorn they were lending. Hence the increased bank
lending to final borrowers, made possible by inter-bank loans, constituted an important
17Figure A3:  Development of Household and Foreign Exchange Deposits (1990 -
1996)
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this res3pect  seem to have been the Sberbanks of the slower reforming countries. These
banks had two characteristics which made them important suppliers of funds to the
18resource-constrained  banks  First,  they  still  had  quite  a  significant  volume  of
households deposits at their disposal. Second, they had relatively little experience of
direct lending on their own account (e.g. to  enterprises). Thus, lending in the inter-
bank market often seemed like a good way to use surplus resources.
15.  In Ukraine, and probably in Russia, the major borrowers in this market during
the 1993-1996 period seemed to have been the newly emerging private banks. Most of
these banks had little access to household deposits and many of them did not enjoy the
resourcing available through the management of budgetary funds and directed credits.
This is exemplified in Figure  A4 below.  It  is noted  from this  that  the  inter-bank
borrowings of the three private banks shown there were generally high as a proportion
of total assets during the early transition years to  1996. In the former state banks by
contrast, the borrowed amounts were generally smaller and showed less tendency to
rise as transition proceeded since they were able to  resource themselves from budget
funds and, in some cases, private deposits.
16.  In the mini banking crises experienced in Russia and Ukraine in 1995 and 1996,
inter-bank borrowings seemed to have been the main route whereby problems in one
or  two  banks  (e.g.  Inko  and  Alex banks  in  Ukraine) were  communicated to  the
banking system more generally. However, because of the minimum absolute size of the
banks and their inter-bank transactions, these problems were easily contained.
17.  A third and more damaging innovation which so far has mainly affected Russia
beginning in 1995 was the introduction of the "veksel" (promissory note). These are
bearer IOUs issued mainly by banks or  brokerage houses at a discount of the face
value at which they can be redeemed on maturity (normally 6-9 months). The Russian
veksels support a system of non cash payment which in 1995 had a turnover estimated
at 20 percent of GDP. 19 Once in circulation they can be used as a substitute for cash
payment by any enterprise or organization which happens to become the temporary
owner.  They have been fairly readily accepted in  an environment of generally low
compliance with payments obligations. However, there are many risks inherent in this
parallel system of payments.
'9 The Wall Street Journal  notes that one Veksel issued  by Tveruniversalbank with a face value of $10,000 had changed hands no less than
23 times and had financed more than 20 times its own face value in payments by the time that it matured.
19Figure  A4:  Development of Interbank Lending in the Ukrainian Banking Sector
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2019.  In short each of the three innovations just described can be seen as premature
in terms of the ability of the banks to monitor and manage the risks to which they were
exposing themselves. In all three cases, many of the participating banks moved ahead
of their own abilities in terms of risk management skill needed to make effective use of
innovations. This resulted in a number of individual banking crises and some limited
system-wide problems. The fact that these problems were not more serious in Russia
and Ukraine  is attributable solely to the very small scale of total banking activity by
the time that these mini crises occurred. 20 By contrast, the Latvian banking crisis in
1995 was both  more  severe in its  impact because  of the  much  larger volume  of
household  deposits  already  at risk,  and  also  more traditional  in  its  causation  and
origins.
Economic  Factors Affecting  the Risk Frontier
20.  Another important contrast between the three comparator countries relate to
their differential situations regarding the  economic influences on the position of the
risk frontier of Figures 1,2 and 3 in the paper.  This is indicated in Figure A5 which
measures the degree of volatility of certain important prices and interest rates based on
quarterly data from 1993 to  1996. The figure reveals the very considerable economnic
turbulence in all three countries during this four year period. Most of the indicators
have a coefficient of variation (standard variation divided by the arithmetic mean) of at
least 0.5 which implies that the level of the indicator has shown a  large amount of
variation from its  average level. However,  for almost all indicators, the  degree  of
volatility is shown to be much greater in the two slower reformning  economnies  - Russia
and Ukraine - than in the faster reforming Latvia. These differences are enough to
suggest that the risk frontier facing Latvian banks has been positioned lower down. (in
Figures  1,2 and 3 in the text)  than the  corresponding frontiers facing Russian  and
Ukrainian banks. To  the extent that Latvian banks nonetheless encountered serious
problems in 1994 and 1995, this is attributable more to their own internal inadequacies
than to the external environmental factors: a very important distinction.
This is not to suggest  that the mini crises in Russia and Ukraine were entirely without cost On the contrary  those crises probably
contributed to a stop-start system of banking development  which has delayed the recovery of financial depth and the slightly more relaxed
monetary management which can accompany this.
21Figure A5:
Degree  of Price  Distortions  1993  - 1996
(measured  by  the coefficient  of variation)
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21.  In particular, Latvia's early success in reducing inflation has meant that it has
achieved reasonably well anchored and predictable values for two important economic
indicators namely the exchange rate and the consumers price index (CPI). This in turn
should have been a factor diluting the risks faced by Latvian banks in their evaluation
of clients. By contrast, Russia and Ukraine have experienced high volatility of these
two and most other economic indicators - a source of a additional risk to the banks in
these  countries. The volatility of rates  in the  Russian inter-bank  market  has been
particularly high and this is indicative of the  considerable pressures on that  market
which have arisen as the mini-crises referred to  earlier have evolved. Not  only has
reliance on this market been a source of credit risk to the participating banks but it has
also been a source of risk in terms of the volatility of the interest rates which have
applied. Russian and Ukrainian banks largely avoided major problems, in spite of this
inhospitable environment because of their relatively conservative lending behavior and
the small scale of the total resources they had available for on-lending.
Conclusions  from  the Empirical Analysis
22.  This  paper  has  presented  and  explained  a  simple  framework,  based  on
informnational  theory,  to  try  to  account  for  the  behavior  of  banking  systems  in
transition economies such as those in the FSU. The perceived advantage of this new
framework is that it provides some basis both for defining the nature of the transition
itself, and for explaining differential developments in countries beginning their sectoral
reforrns from essentially similar starting points. This should help us to get away from
approaches which have generally been silent about the nature of the transition itself It
22should  also  help  to  explain  differential financial  sector  performance  in  different
countries.
23.  The empirical evidence adduced in this Annex  is admittedly limited at this
stage. It has been included in the paper mainly to suggest specific hypotheses for more
in-depth testing across a wider range of countries. However, it has been sufficient,
even at this initial stage to lend support to a number of important propositions about
the transition process. In particular:
*  Group  A  countries  (slower  adjusters)  in  the  FSU  have definitely seen  larger
declines  in  the  sizes  of  their  banking  sectors  than  Group  2  countries  (fast
reformers). This is because of the longer period of negative real rates of interest
following the initial commodity price rises associated with  price liberalization in
1992 and the more prolonged need for governments to use inflationary methods to
finance large deficits.
*  Group A countries nonetheless seem to have been less prone to systemic banking
crises because of the very small size of household deposits; the concentration of
these in a single Sberbank; the limited informational problems associated with the
type of lending which they do; the implicit under-writing of many bank loans to
SOEs  by  government;  and  the  high  margins  and  profitability associated  with
distorted  prices (including Forex).  The increased risks to  which banks in these
countries have exposed themselves through increased Forex activity, ill-considered
inter-bank transactions etc. have been diluted in their practical consequences by the
same factors.
- Group B countries (faster reformers) can be expected to experience systemic crisis
earlier because of the larger size of their banking systems; their greater exposure to
household  and  other voluntary  deposits  (making bank  runs  more likely); their
earlier exposure to positive real interest rates and the associated adverse selection
problems; and the greater pressures they faced because of tighter fiscal positions.
Even when the general economic context in which they function is relatively stable
and predictable, the  evidence from Latvia indicates that  inadequate information
processing and risk management in the banks themselves can easily be the trigger
for the crisis.
*  Specific cases of banking crises are more likely in systems where  a  fairly rapid
growth  of  bank lending is taking place but  before internal bank  controls (and
associated regulation and supervision) are strong enough to  deal with the inherent
combined riskiness of the banks'  operating environment and their attempted rapid
growth.
24.  A related proposition which has not yet been exposed to  any testing is that
banks  in  Group  B  countries  (faster  reforming),  where  enterprise  privatization
proceeded  rapidly faced  two  additional but  competing pressures  on  their  safety.
23Privatization  would have intensified  the informational  problems  associated  with bank
lending (leading to greater risk), but it would also have accelerated the pace of
enterprise  restructuring  which  should  have  lessened  risk. 21 Similarly,  banks in countries
where liberalized  foreign exchange  markets resulted in highly  volatile exchange  rate
movements  were more likely  to face more serious  banking  sector problems,  especially
when  this high  volatility  was associated  with highly  positive  real rates of interest,  rapid
privatization  and a rapid growth of interest in real terms. The privatization  of banks
themselves  presents  additional  questions.  When such privatization,  or corporatization,
is done early  in the transition  as in Russia, the new owners  are likely  retain important
links with SOEs and the government.  However, they  will also face considerable
pressures  to move the bank into new forms of activity  at just the time they are losing
their formal  protection  from state institutions.  This combination  of factors  would seem
to have the potential  to stimulate  substantial  movements  along the horizontal  axis of
Figures 1 and 2 towards riskier  activities.
2' This is a significant  conclusion of the paper by G. Pohl, R. Anderson  and S. Djankov, Privatization and Restructuring in Central and
Eastern Europe, World Bank Technical paper, No. 369, 1997.
24TABLE A2
STYLISED FACTS ABOUT THE FSU TRANSITION
Pre-1991:  Introduction of  two-tier banking  Transfer of assets from mono-bank  /
system  to newly  created  commercial  banks  =  $  -:
that also inherited a  stock of non-  .,.
perforning loans
Stage 1: Generalized  Price Liberalization  Stage  1:  Generalized  Price
Liberalization
Effects  included:  j.
Higher price  level  (P)  rapidly eliminated  *  The  general  increase  in
much of money overhang  (i.e. the difference  economic uncertainty caused
between money  balances  actually  held by the  by  liberal  (and  now
public and those that they would optimally  unpredictable)  prices gave rise
have  chosen to  hold)  and  the  associated  to an immediate  intensification
excess demand  for commodities;  of adverse  selection  and moral
hazard problems.  /  ,'
*  smaller  monetary aggregates
and  reduced banking system
liabilities - Sperbanks as  the
holder  of  most  household
deposits was  most  seriously
affected  by this fall.
*  Early foreign  exchange  market
liberalization  in some countries
was  a  further  source  of
additional  uncertainty  and fisk.
Stage 2:  Increase in  Government Dis-saving  Stage 2: Increase in Government
depending  on country)  Dis-saving  depending  on  country
Causes  were:
*  lower  production  and income  levels resulting  *  Output deflation resulted in a
in lower  tax revenues;  deterioration of the net worth
*  larger deficits in State Enterprises (SOEs)  positions in enterprises and a
caused  by  failure  to  adjust  wages  and  corresponding  deterioration in
employment  levels  to  correspond  with  the  quality of  bank  balance-  .
reduced levels of production  (this affects the  sheets.
quasi-fiscal  deficit  but rnay  not be captured  in
the measurement  of the fiscal  deficit).
*  Deteriorating net  worth  in
Effects  were:  SOES  caused  deteriorating
balance  sheets in banks
25*  increased use  of  inflation tax  to  finance  *  Negative real rates of interest
Government  fiscal  and quasi fiscal  deficits (in  made  it  more  difficult  for
the  absence of  non-inflationary routes  to  banks  to  attract  voluntary  ".  2
achieve  this financing);  deposits in local currency and  a  "  a
*  negative  real rates of interest given low (and  further  undermined  one
often  still  controlled) nominal rates  and  traditional  source  of  profit.  /
ongoing inflation;  This  in  turn  was  a  possible  ,  ,,  a  >  < 
motive  for  intensified  risk
*  (in  sorme  countries )  the  extensive use  of  taking.  This  problem  was
directed  credits through  some state or former  partly  one  of  currency
state  banks  (partly refinanced.  by  Central  substitution  by depositors.  '
Bank credits).  *  significant enterprise balances
in these banks benefiting  from
directed credits (i.e. a  power  '
shift from  the Sperbanks which
depended  on  household  "i''  ~
deposits to the Lending banks 
which depended  on enterprise
deposits);  ""
*  Access to directed credits and
associated  subsidized  funds via
Central  Bank  rediscounts
compensated some banks  for
losses of household resourcesn
and provided a new source of  t
profit.  This  new  source  of  in
resources and profits was alsost
arguably  relatively  safe
because  of  the  implicit  or
explicit  guarantee  from
government.
Stage 3: Ongoing High Infiation for  5-6 years  Stage 3:  Ongoing High Inflation
(depending  on country)  for  5-6  years  (depenr  cng  on  ,
country)
Here  we  rieed to  differentiate the  effects as
between Group A countries  (those relatively  slow  h  The  banks'  difficulties  in
to  reform  aind adjust)  and  Group  B  countries  attracting  voluntary  deposits
(faster reformers).  The later group was also likely  intensified and placed further
to achieve  an earlier  stabilization  of inflation.  pressures  on them to move into  ~  '~~
Effects  were:  ~~~~~~~~~~~riskier  forms  of activity.
Group A:  countries  which adjusted more slowly  *  There was some reduction in
(in  terms of  the  liberalization of markets, the  the  systemic risks  associated
reduction or fiscal deficits, the privatization  and  with the banking sector due to
enforcement: of  hard  budget  constraints  in  the  new  lower  scale  of
enterprises, and  their  resulting poor access to  probable  losses  and  also  ~
external  donior  funding).  because  of  generally  high
interest  margins.
22  i.e. the equilibrium that was determiined  by the initial set of economnic  conditions applying in 1991 at the start of the transition. The
equilibriumn  was not achieved then  because of controlled commodity prices (resulting in excess demand for commodities and an associated
involuntary holding of money balances).
26*  High rate of  inflation due to continued large
monetary financing of  deficits, continuing  *  In cases where rinterest rates
negative real  rates  of  interest,  continued  became  very high, there was a
pressures  from non-disciplined  SOEs,  and the  direct increase in problems of
break up of the ruble  zone in 1992/93  (which  adverse selection and  moral
created  the  possibility  for  money  creation  hazard.
independently  of the Central  Bank of Russia);  . Bn  ba  more a  in
'  *  Banks becarne more active in  f  - --- 
*  Further  adjustment towards  some  initial  FRXdpsttkn  n 
equilibrium 22 in  the  public's  holdings of  lending and  thereby escaped
money  balances,  plus  a  shift  in  that  s  of  t  down-sizin
equilibrium  towards a  lower  (optimally)  otherwise  associated  with  de-
desuiibreduleveoiae.  s  furtherptmaly  monetization  and  cur-rency  ~ 
desired  level i.e. a further  substitution. In  the  process
shrinking  of  the  banking  sector  from  the  they gained access to potential
resourcing  side;  FOREX profits (through high
*  The inflationary  write-down of bank  loans  margins and  open  positions)
and other assets as well as bank capital i.e a
shrinkage  of banking from the assets side of  new risks.
the balance  sheet
Group  B:  in  countries  which  adjusted  more
rapidly there were several important differences
compared  to  the  Group  A  (slow  adjusting
countries). These included:
*  Smaller Fiscal Deficits  (because of  early
fiscal  adjustment);
*  Less  pressure  from  quasi  fiscal  deficits
(because of earlier disciplining of SOEs);f
*  Easier and less inflationary  financing  of fiscal
and  quasi fiscal deficits because of  early
access  to  significant  resourcing  from
domestic  re-monetization and external  donor
agencies;  *  The  greater incidence  of bank
*  Lower  reliance  on the inflation  tax resulted  in  lending  to  newly  privatized
less negative real  rates  of  interest  or  an  companies  increased  banks'  .3ag 
earlier moves to positive real interest rates,  informational  problems
*  More  favorable  interest  rates  and  less  especially  in  countries  where  f
inflation uncertainty reduced  the scale of the  there was a rapid expansion  of  . 7
further  dis-intermediation  - i.e.  such lending.
banking/financial  sectors  shrunk  less.
*  However  in  those  enterprises
where restructuring  took place,
the  net  worth  positions
improved as  did  the  balance
sheets of the banks
Stage 4: Inflation  Stabilization  Stage  4: Inflation  Stabilization
Methods of achieving this included:
*  Reduced  fiscal  and quasi fiscal  deficits;  *  Tighter money caused a  large
*  Increased  reliance  on  foreign  borrowing  build up of inter-enterprise and  '
(mainly public but  later private  in  some  enterprise:government arrears
countries) which allowed  a higher  volume  of  and  so  created  a  kind  of
imports  to  dilute  price  pressures  via  substitute  banking  sector
commodity demands and supplies;
27*  Reduced monetary financing of  fiscal and  /  A."  /
quasi fiscal  deficits; 
*  Increased use  of  non-monetary financing  *  In  cases  where  Treasury
instruments  including  Treasury  Securities.  Securities were launched in a
*  Generic :reforms  such as privatization  and  climate of still - high interest
liberalization  which take some pressure off  rates, they provide the banks
deficit financing  and the need for active use  with a substitute  asset offering
of the infation  tax.  low risk and high return  . "
The results in the slower adjusting countries  as
defined  above  included.
*  High nominal and real rates of interest
caused  in  part  by  slow  decline  in  *  A direct increase in problems
inflationary  expectations;  of adverse selection  and moral 
*  Ongoing  and large reductions  in levels of  hazard.  fr/ 
production  associated  with  the  severity
of the delayed  adjustment);  *  A  further deterioration of the
*  Pressures on the earnings and liquidity  net  worth  positions  in
of banks which responded to  Stage 3  enterprises  and  a
above by (i) becoming more dependent  corresponding  deterioration in
on clirected  credits and the counterpart  the  quality of  bank  balance-
enterprise and  budget balances  as  a  sheets.
source of resources; and  (b) profiting
frorn  unstable exchange  rates.  *  A declining  ability of banks to
use the directed  credits  and the
governmnent  guarantees  as both
a  resource  and  a  source  of
profit.  A
I  n  cases where the  Treasury  '
Securities wee launched,  they
provide  the  banks  with  a
substitute asset  offering low
risk and high return
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